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Talking Foreign Policy Transcript
Talking Foreign Policy is a one-hour radio program, hosted by the dean of 
Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Michael Scharf, in which 
experts discuss important foreign policy issues. The premier broadcast 
(airdate: March 1, 2012) covered the controversial use of Predator drones, 
humanitarian intervention in Syria, and responding to Iran’s acquisition 
of nuclear weapons. Subsequent broadcasts have covered topics such as the 
challenges of bringing indicted tyrants to justice, America’s Afghanistan exit 
strategy, the issue of presidential power in a war without end, and President 
Obama’s second term foreign policy team. This broadcast focused on the 
US-North Korea Nuclear Summit. 
The purpose of the radio show is to cover some of the most salient foreign 
policy topics and discuss them in a way that can make it easier for listeners 
to grasp. Talking Foreign Policy is recorded in the WCPN 90.3 Ideastream 
studio, Cleveland’s NPR affiliate. Michael Scharf is joined each session 
with a few expert colleagues known for their ability to discuss complex 
topics in an easy-to-digest manner:
• The ethicist: Shannon French, director of Case Western 
Reserve’s Inamori Center for Ethics and Excellence;
• The Asian Studies expert: Professor Tim Webster, director of 
East Asian Legal Studies at Case Western Reserve University; 
• The international law guru: Milena Sterio, associate dean of 
The Cleveland Marshall College of Law; and
• The negotiator: Paul Williams, president of the Public Interna-
tional Law and Policy Group.
Archived broadcasts (both in audio and video format) of Talking Foreign 
Policy are available at: https://law.case.edu/TalkingForeignPolicy.
Talking Foreign Policy—May 24, 2018 broadcast1
Participants 
Michael Scharf 
1.  Transcript edited and footnotes added by Cox Center Fellows Emma Lawson, Alexander 
Peters, Courtney Koski, and Senior Cox Center Fellow Alexandra Mooney.
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scharf: The United States and North Korea—two countries that fought 
a brutal war and never made peace. No sitting US President has met with his 
North Korean counterpart;2 but a few months ago, North Korean president 
Kim Jong Un warned that the whole of the United States was in range of 
his country’s nuclear weapons, and President Trump responded by calling 
Kim “Little Rocket Man” and threatening to annihilate his nation.3 Then, 
in a dramatic turnabout in March, the two leaders agreed to hold a historic 
presidential summit.4 But on May 24, President Trump announced that the 
summit was off.5 In this broadcast of Talking Foreign Policy, we’ve assembled 
a panel of experts on peace negotiations, national security, human rights, 
and Asian affairs to discuss the prospects and pitfalls for a US-North Korea 
Summit, right after the news.
 Welcome to Talking Foreign Policy. I’m your host Michael Scharf, dean of 
Case Western Reserve University School of Law. In this broadcast, our expert 
panelists will be discussing the prospects for a US-North Korea Summit. For 
our program today, we’ve assembled a panel of experts on peace negotiations, 
national security, human rights, and North Korean-US diplomacy. Joining us 
from a studio in Washington, DC, is Dr. Paul Williams,6 the president of the 
2.  Robbie Gramer and Emily Tamkin, “Decades of US Diplomacy with North 
Korea: a Timeline,” Foreign Policy, March 12, 2018, 6:48 p.m., https://foreignpolicy.
com/2018/03/12/a-timeline-of-u-s-negotiations-talks-with-north-korea-trump-kim 
-jong-un-pyongyang-nuclear-weapons-diplomacy-asia-security/.
3.  Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, November 30, 2017, 7:25 a.m., https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/936209447747190784.
4.  Gramer and Tamkin, supra note 2.
5.  Mark Landler, “Trump Pulls Out of North Korea Summit Meeting with Kim Jong-un,” 
New York Times, May 24, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/world/asia 
/north-korea-trump-summit.html. Trump subsequently changed his mind and the Summit 
was held on June 11, 2018. For a summary of the summit, see David Jackson, “US-North 
Korea Summit,” USA Today, June 12, 2018, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news 
/politics/2018/06/11/singapore-donald-trump-kim-jong-un-denuclearization 
-summit/689817002/.
6.  Paul Williams, Faculty, American University Washington College of Law, http://www.wcl 
.american.edu/faculty/pwilliams/. Paul R. Williams holds the Rebecca I. Grazier Profes-
sorship in Law and International Relations at American University. Professor Williams 
teaches at the School of International Service and the Washington College of Law and also 
directs the joint JD/MA program in International Relations. Prior to his arrival at Ameri-
can University, Paul Williams served as a Senior Associate with the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace and a Fulbright Research Scholar at the University of Cambridge.
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Public International Law and Policy Group—a Nobel Peace Prize nominated 
NGO that has provided legal counsel in a dozen peace negotiations over the 
past twenty-two years.7 Welcome to the show Paul! 
williams: Thanks, Michael. It’s my pleasure. 
scharf: And in our studio in Cleveland, I’m joined by Dr. Shannon 
French,8 a former faculty member of the US Naval Academy who now 
directs the Inamori International Center for Ethics and Excellence at Case 
Western Reserve University. She’s also director of the nation’s first ever 
master’s program in military ethics.9 Thanks for being with us, Shannon. 
french: Thanks, Michael. Happy to be here. 
scharf: Also here with me is Professor Milena Sterio,10 the associate 
dean of Cleveland Marshall College of Law and renowned international 
law expert. It’s good to see you again, Milena. 
sterio: It is great to be here. 
scharf: And, finally, we have Professor Tim Webster,11 the director of 
East Asian Legal Studies at Case Western Reserve University. Welcome, Tim. 
webster: Thank you, Michael. 
scharf: So, let’s begin with a short refresher on US-North Korean rela-
tions. When the Korean conflict ended in 1953, there was no peace agree-
ment—only an armistice.12 Milena, as an international law expert, can you 
tell us the implications of that? 
7.  PILPG, accessed January 1, 2019, https://www.publicinternationallawandpolicygroup 
.org/.
8.  Shannon E. French, PhD, Case Western Reserve University, https://case.edu/inamori 
/about-the-center/staff/shannon-french. Prior to her involvement in CWRU School of 
Law, Shannon French taught ethics for eleven years at the United States Naval Academy 
and served as associate chair of the Department of Leadership, Ethics, and Law.
9.  “Master of Arts in Military Ethics at Case Western Reserve University,” Case Western 
Reserve University, accessed January 1, 2019, http://militaryethics.case.edu/.
10.  Milena Sterio, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, http://facultyprofile.csuohio.edu 
/csufacultyprofile/detail.cfm?FacultyID=M_STERIO. Before joining Cleveland-Marshall, 
Milena Sterio worked as an associate at Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen and Hamilton in New York 
City and as an adjunct law professor at Cornell.
11.  Timothy Webster, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, accessed January 1, 
2019, https://law.case.edu/Our-School/Faculty-Staff/Meet-Our-Faculty/Faculty-Detail 
/id/1020. Before joining Case, Timothy Webster was a lecturer at Yale Law School and 
senior fellow at its China Law Center. He has held visiting professorships at the University 
of Paris—Dauphine, National Taiwan University, and Southwest University of Political 
Science and Law (Chongqing, China).
12.  “Armistice Agreement for the Restoration of the South Korean State (1953),” Our 
Documents 1993, accessed January 1, 2019, https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php 
?flash=false&doc=85. 3
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sterio: Sure. So, the Korean armistice agreement, which was signed 
in 1953, was an agreement signed by the armies of North Korea, China, 
and the United States, and that brought an end to the hostilities to the 
war that was going on in Korea at the time.13 However, it was not a peace 
treaty signed by the respected governments, meaning that there were lots 
of unresolved issues that did not end with the armistice.14
scharf: And then in the aftermath, there was a massive military buildup 
on both sides. There were landmines placed in the demilitarized zone, and 
there was a lot of negative rhetoric, right?15
sterio: Exactly, and there was supposed to be a peace treaty. The idea 
at the time was basically to end the conflict, sign the armistice, and then 
negotiate a peace treaty. The problem is that that peace treaty was never 
actually negotiated. So, up to this date, there is no peace treaty for Korea.16 
scharf: So, let’s fast-forward to the year 2002. That’s the year that North 
Korea admitted to having a nuclear weapons program, and it withdrew 
from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.17 Paul, can you tell us what the 
significance of that would be? 
williams: Well, Michael, that was hugely significant. The Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty is essentially the cornerstone of global nuclear security.18 
By exiting that treaty, North Korea was essentially signaling that it was going 
to go nuclear, so to speak; and it did.19 And by exiting the treaty, all bets for 
verification, for monitoring—those doors were all closed, and North Korea 
was essentially able to aggressively pursue its nuclear program.20 
scharf: Well why would it want to do that? 
williams: Deterrence? The end of the conflict between the US and North 
Korea, as Milena had mentioned, was an armistice, it wasn’t a peace deal. 
13.  Id.
14.  Id.
15.  Joori Roh and Josh Smith, “North, South Korea Begin Removing Landmines Along 
Fortified Border,” Reuters September 30, 2018, 11:22 p.m., https://www.reuters.com 
/article/us-northkorea-southkorea-dmz/north-south-korea-begin-removing-landmines 
-along-fortified-border-idUSKCN1MB1BG.
16.  Edward Wong, “Why Is the US Wary of a Declaration to End the Korean War”, New 
York Times August 13, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/13/world/asia/korea 
-peace-treaty-trump-us.html.
17.  Gramer and Tamkin, supra note 2.
18.  Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1 July 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 
U.N.T.S. 161, https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text. 
19.  Gramer and Tamkin, supra note 2.
20.  Id. 4
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American troops remain in great numbers in South Korea and have engaged 
in annual war gaming near the border. North Korea wanted to basically 
have a nuclear weapons capability in order to, one, protect itself; and two, to 
reshape the geo-political environment on the Korean peninsula and in Asia.21 
scharf: It turns out, it wasn’t just bluffing, because in 2006, North 
Korea announced its first successful nuclear weapons test.22 And in the 
following years, North Korea announced a number of additional successful 
tests, including the underground explosion of a hydrogen bomb.23 Then 
it turned to testing long-range missiles.24 Milena and Paul, how did the 
international community respond to these developments? 
sterio: One of the things that happened is that the United Nations 
Security Council adopted several resolutions related to North Korea. There 
actually have been a total of twenty-one resolutions on North Korea since 
the 1950s, but nine resolutions which imposed crippling sanctions against 
North Korea over the past twelve years or so, the last of which was just a 
few months ago.25 The sanctions ended up being tightened up over the years 
and imposed on several sectors of the North Korean economy, including 
on North Korean exports. And the idea, obviously, of sanctions is to try 
to persuade without use of force the North Korean government to cease 
and desist from developing a nuclear weapons arsenal.
scharf: So, that was the stick. Paul, can you tell us about any carrots 
that were attempted? 
williams: Yeah, in addition to the sticks that Milena had mentioned, 
the international community launched the six-party talks—which included 
the United States, North Korea, South Korea, as well as China, Japan, and 
Russia.26 And it was an off and on negotiation—and I should note that when 
the negotiations were off, the North Koreans were testing their nuclear 
weapons, their missiles, their rockets.27 And in fact, just a year prior to the 
announcement of these talks, the North Koreans had done significant testing.28 
21.  “Why Does North Korea Want Nukes,” Heritage August 13, 2018, https://www 
.heritage.org/insider/summer-2018-insider/why-does-north-korea-want-nukes.
22.  Gramer and Tamkin, supra note 2.
23.  Id.
24.  Id.
25.  Kelsey Davenport, UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea, Arms Control Ass’n, 
updated January 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council 
-Resolutions-on-North-Korea.
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And every year since 2013, they’ve tested their nuclear weapons capability 
or further refined it, while at the same time saying they were interested in 
negotiations and talks to end that program.29 
scharf: Alright. So, then after Donald Trump was elected president, the 
leaders of the two countries began to use ever more threatening rhetoric 
in their conversation over Twitter and press releases. Let me provide a few 
quotes to give the listening audience an idea of what I’m talking about. So 
first, the president of North Korea, Kim Jong Un, said: 
 “The whole of the US mainland is within our nuclear strike range. The 
nuclear button is always on my table. The US must realize that this is not 
a threat, but reality.”30
 Now, Donald Trump responds:  
 “North Korean leader Kim Jong Un just said the ‘Nuclear Button is on 
his desk at all times.’ Will someone from his depleted and food starved 
regime please inform him that I too have a Nuclear Button, but it is a much 
bigger & more powerful one than his, and my Button works!”31 
 Trump also said, “Kim Jong Un of North Korea, who is obviously a 
madman who doesn’t mind starving or killing his people, will be tested like 
never before!”32 And Kim responded, “I will surely and definitely tame the 
deranged US dotard with fire.”33 And at that point a lot of people looked 
up the word “dotard.” [Laughter] Trump then responds, “They will be met 
with fire and fury like the world has never seen.”34 And now, let me ask 
the panelists, how unusual is this kind of rhetoric to be coming from two 
presidents of sovereign countries in the world today? Anybody? Tim. 
29.  Kelsey Davenport, Chronology of US-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy: 2013, 
Arms Control Ass’n, updated December 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets 
/dprkchron#2013.
30.  Bruce Harrison et al., “Kim Highlights ‘Nuclear Button’ on His Desk, Offers Olympic 
Talks,” NBC News, December 31, 2017, 9:58 p.m., accessed November 4, 2018, https://
www.nbcnews.com/news/north-korea/kim-says-north-korea-s-nuclear-weapons-will 
-prevent-war-n833781.
31.  Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, January 2, 2018, 7:49 p.m., https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/948355557022420992?lang=en.
32.  Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter September 22, 2017, 5:28 a.m., https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/911175246853664768.
33.  Anna Fifield, “Kim Jong Un Calls Trump a ‘Mentally Deranged US Dotard,’” Washing-
ton Post, September 21, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews 
/wp/2017/09/21/north-korean-leader-to-trump-i-will-surely-and-definitely-tame-the 
-mentally-deranged-u-s-dotard-with-fire.
34.  Jonathan Ernst, “Trump Says North Korea Will Be Met with ‘Fire and Fury’ If It 
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webster: Well, from North Korea’s side, it’s actually pretty common. 
This kind of bellicose, very floral, very over the top language is just sort of 
de rigueur. That’s the way they communicate. You can see this parodied in 
popular culture from Thirty Rock,35 the great TV show with Tina Fey, to 
The Interview, a movie starring James Franco and Seth Rogan.36 So, it’s no 
surprise that North Korea uses this kind of language. What is surprising 
and what is sort of unprecedented, is that we have an American president 
playing along. Usually, they say nothing, or occasionally they’ll make an 
off the cuff insult. George Bush called Kim Jong Il “a pygmy,”37 you know, 
those kinds of things. But we’ve never seen this sort of back and forth, and 
of course Trump loves the drama. He loves the angst. He loves the limelight. 
And that’s why you have this exchange of heightened and fiery rhetoric. 
scharf: How dangerous do you think this is? Shannon?
french: What bothers me is that it’s so petulant and undignified, and it 
seems to not take into account the moral weight of the kinds of decisions 
that are on the table here. So, it comes across like a game with schoolboys, 
but the stakes are too high for that. 
scharf: So, then on March 8, in the middle of all this rhetoric, President 
Trump announces that he is willing to sit down with Kim Jong Un for a 
nuclear peace summit.38 Tim, as an Asian specialist, how do you explain 
the sudden turnabout? 
webster: If you go back to the campaign trail, Trump said on a number 
of occasions that he would be willing to sit down and talk to Kim Jong 
Un.39 He said he wanted to open a dialogue, he said there was no problem 
with that. And in making that kind of pronouncement, Trump is doing 
just what Obama did when Obama was a candidate in 2008.40 Even toward 
the end of the Clinton administration in 2000, Clinton said, “I’m willing 
to go meet with Kim Jong Il,” who was Kim Jong Un’s father. Clinton, 
35.  30 Rock, Universal Media Studios and Universal Television, Seasons 5 and 6.
36.  The Interview, Point Grey Pictures and LStar Capital, 2014.
37.  Helene Cooper, “Bush Writes to North Korean Leader,” New York Times, December 6, 
2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/06/world/asia/06cnd-korea.html.
38.  Gramer and Tamkin, supra note 2.
39.  Steven Holland and Emily Flitter, “Exclusive: Trump Would Talk to North Korea’s 
Kim, Wants to Renegotiate Climate Accord,” Reuters, May 17, 2016, 5:03 p.m., https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-exclusive-iduskcn0y82jo.
40.  Bryon York, “Obama, without Preconditions or Preparation,” National Review, July 23, 
2008, 4:55 p.m., https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/obama-without-preconditions 
-or-preparation-byron-york/.
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of course, sent Secretary of State Madeline Albright, who then met with 
Kim Jong Il,41 but this would have been the first meeting between sitting 
presidents or sitting leaders of the two countries. So, was it a big turnabout? 
I think once it became clear that North Korea could actually hit the US 
with a nuclear missile, that changed the stakes. 
scharf: Shannon, how do you read it? 
french: I agree that this move is in response to some of the technologi-
cal advances by North Korea, but it also shows what I would almost want 
to call a weird kind of optimism on the part of President Trump—that he 
thinks he can make some kind of dramatic change or shift that we haven’t 
seen in the past, precisely by doing what hasn’t been done in the past. But, 
it ignores the lessons of history. 
scharf: And Milena, do you take this at face value? Or are you more 
cynical? 
sterio: You can go ahead and announce a big summit, but I think if 
you want to be successful, if you want to actually achieve something at 
that summit, almost all diplomacy experts would agree that there is a ton 
of work that would need to be done in advance of the summit. There is so 
much that would need to be pre-negotiated before the summit. So, to go 
ahead and announce that in two weeks the President of the United States 
is going to meet with the President of North Korea, it’s really posturing 
more than anything else. And it’s unrealistic to think that in such a short 
time frame you can actually achieve a true peace treaty. 
scharf: So, you never really thought that the Summit was going to 
happen, or not on June 12 at least. 
sterio: Well I either thought it wasn’t going to happen, or I thought 
if it does happen then nothing much will actually come out of it, and if 
anything Donald Trump could then say, “You know, I tried. I went there 
and I tried, and they wouldn’t agree to anything.” 
scharf: So then on May 24, President Trump, perhaps predictably, sent 
the following message to Kim Jong Un, and of course he released it for 
wide publication in every newspaper around the world:
41.  Anna Fifield, David Nakamura, and Seung Min Kim, “Trump Accepts Invitation To 
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 “Sadly, based on the tremendous anger and open hostility displayed in 
your most recent statements, I feel that it is inappropriate at this time to 
have this long-planned meeting. Therefore, please let this letter represent 
that the Singapore Summit, for the good of both parties, but to the detri-
ment of the world, will not take place.”42
 Trump goes on to say, “You talk about your nuclear capabilities, but ours 
are so massive and powerful that I pray to God that they will never have 
to be used.”43 Kind of a thinly veiled threat there. Well when we return 
after our short break, our experts are going to tell us what they make of 
this latest turn of events, whether they think the summit ever will take 
place, and what’s at stake. We’ll be back in just a moment. 
 Welcome back to Talking Foreign Policy, brought to you by Case Western 
Reserve University and WCPN 90.3 idea stream. I’m Michael Scharf, dean 
of Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I’m joined today by 
famed peace negotiator, Dr. Paul Williams, military ethicist, Dr. Shan-
non French, international law guru, Associate Dean Melina Sterio, and an 
Asian Affairs expert, Professor Tim Webster. We’re talking today about 
the prospects of a US-North Korean Summit. It’s really extraordinary that 
two countries with such acrimonious relations seem to be at the verge of 
actually holding peace talks. Let me begin with Tim Webster, and ask, 
assuming there is going to be a summit at some point, what would the 
United States be getting in return for agreeing to these talks? 
webster: First a word about what Kim Jong Un gets. When Donald 
Trump, or any other US president stands next to and appears in a photo-op 
with the North Korean leader, that is of tremendous propaganda value for 
North Korea and for the idea that Kim Jong Uung-un is of equal stature 
with the world’s great leaders. For Trump, the US has for decades tried to 
denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. The long-term goal of the US is the 
complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the peninsula.44 
Recently, Kim Jong Un had suggested that they would suspend missile 
launches, they would suspend nuclear tests, they would dismantle one of 
their nuclear test sites, which they actually did today, apparently, in view 
42.  David E. Sanger, “Trump’s Letter to Kim Canceling North Korea Summit Meeting, 
Annotated,” New York Times, May 24, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24 
/world/asia/read-trumps-letter-to-kim-jong-un.html.
43.  Id.
44.  David Welna, “Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible’ A Tough Goal For North Korea Sum-
mit,” NPR, June 6, 2018, 5:57 p.m., https://www.npr.org/2018/06/06/617619192 
/complete-verifiable-irreversible-a-tough-goal-for-north-korea-summit.
9
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of journalists.45 So, those were sort of steps seen as a path forward to a total 
denuclearization. But with the tossing out of the Summit recently, it’s not 
clear that those will move forward. But the long-term strategy, the long-
term plan of the US, is the complete denuclearization of the peninsula.46 
scharf: Well, earlier in the broadcast, Paul Williams was telling us that 
back in 2002, when North Korea decided to start engaging in the develop-
ment of nuclear weapons,47 North Korean leaders did that for their own 
protection. And I want to return to that thought with you, Paul. What was 
going on in the rest of the world that would have made North Korea feel that 
they needed nuclear weapons to protect themselves from the United States? 
williams: Well, I think the North Koreans have always been paranoid 
about their survivability. There was the end of the Cold War, there was 
the reduction of nuclear weapon stockpiles around the globe, and there 
was a sense that there was a changing time and that, you know, the clock 
was running out for dictators like Mu’ammar Gaddhafi, Saddam Hussein, 
and Kim Jong Il , and that if they wanted to keep their family totalitarian 
regime going in North Korea, they needed some kind of bargaining chip 
to put on the table.48 And nuclear weapons were the most obvious. 
scharf: Well, Paul, what about the rhetoric and events leading to the 
2003 US invasion of Iraq? Do you think those played any role? 
williams: Well, I think it was very clear at the time that the United States 
was willing to engage in a regime change in order to protect its strategic 
interests. You know there were the actions in Afghanistan,49 the actions 
in Iraq,50 there was Libya giving up its nuclear weapons around that time 
in exchange for economic inducements,51 and the North Koreans simply 
45.  Reuters, “North Korea Hosts Media To See Closing of Nuclear Site,” New York Post, 
May 23, 2018, 8:02 a.m., accessed November 4, 2018, https://nypost.com/2018/05/23 
/foreign-media-journey-to-see-north-korea-dismantle-nuclear-test-site/.
46.  Welna, supra note 44.
47.  Gramer and Tamkin, supra note 2.
48.  Erin Blakemore, “Bill Clinton Once Struck a Nuclear Deal with North Korea,” His-
tory, April 17, 2018, https://www.history.com/news/north-korea-nuclear-deal-bill 
-clinton-agreed-framework.
49.  US Relations with Afghanistan, US Department of State, July 26, 2018, https://www.state 
.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm.
50.  Robert D. Kaplan and Rodger Baker, “Why North Korea Needs Nukes,” Forbes, 
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thought, “We need to go nuclear in order to preserve our ‘way of life,’” as 
they like to call it in North Korea.
scharf: So, based on that, Paul, do you think there’s any real possibility 
that Kim Jong Un will actually give up all of his nuclear weapons, which seem 
to be not only the source of his power and security, but perhaps his very life? 
williams: No.
scharf: Care to elaborate? 
williams: Kim likes to put denuclearization on the table, and he often 
does that months before he conducts a dramatic test or a dramatic leap is 
made in their nuclear capacity. So, this whole notion of “Oh we’re willing 
to denuclearize” came up quite often in the six-party talks.52 It’s one of their 
talking points that they use to induce the United States. As Tim said, what 
does the United States want? It wants denuclearization of the Korean Pen-
insula. Kim says “Hey, I’ll denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, can we have 
a summit, can we go to Singapore, can I get a photo-op, can I get sanctions 
lifted, can we enter into long and tortuous negotiations which will yield me 
both psychological as well as economic benefit?” But, it’s going to be very, 
very difficult for the North Koreans to give up those weapons if they want to 
continue the tyrannical regime that they use to govern or oppress their people. 
scharf: Well and there’s two ways that could go. One possibility is nego-
tiations that go on and on and never bear fruit. The other is negotiations 
that bear fruit in terms of signing an agreement but then are cheated upon 
afterward. And let me ask Milena, our expert in international law, based on 
past precedent, such as in Iraq and Libya, how could the US ensure that a 
deal with North Korea was verifiable? What would happen if North Korea 
did cheat? 
sterio: So, imagine a peace treaty where North Korea agrees to gradually 
reduce and then destroy its arsenal of nuclear technology. There could be a 
verification inspection regime set up. It also depends if this is negotiated just 
between the United States and North Korea, or if there is an international 
organization involved. When it comes to other countries, there have been 
other international organizations involved in those verification inspection 
regimes. For example, the International Atomic Energy Agency53 and the 
52.  Kelsey Davenport, The Six-Party Talks at a Glance, Arms Control Association, June 2018, 
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/6partytalks.
53.  “Overview,” International Atomic Energy Agency, https://www.iaea.org/.
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comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty organization.54 Those organizations 
can send inspectors to the relevant countries, and basically engage in inspec-
tion and verification. But that requires the agreement and cooperation 
by the relevant countries.55 So North Korea would have to accept those 
inspections, and if it cheated then sanctions could be reimposed. If we’re 
talking about US sanctions, then the US government is obviously free 
to reimpose sanctions. If we’re talking about UN sanctions, typically the 
Security Council would have to vote to reimpose sanctions.56 
scharf: Not too long ago, something like this was tried for Syria to 
take away its chemical weapons.57 How well did that work?
sterio: Right, there is precedent here. I think the North Koreans are 
focused not so much on Syria but on Iraq and Libya, which you already 
mentioned. From the North Korean perspective, they’re looking at Iraq 
and Libya, where there was an inspection regime put in place.58 You could 
make the argument that Gaddhafi, the Libyan leader in 2003, really tried to 
respect the investigation and verification regime related to the destruction 
of his chemical weapons. Ultimately, that road resulted in regime change 
and Gaddhafi’s death.59 As for Iraq, after Saddam Hussein was weakened 
by the Security Council obligations that Iraq undertook after the 1991 
Persian Gulf War, there was the 2003 US invasion, and Saddam Hussein 
was ultimately convicted and put to death.60 From the North Korean 
perspective of looking at these precedents, I’m skeptical, like Paul, because 
I really don’t see what’s in it for them. Looking at these precedents, they 
might say, “Even if we agree now this might not work out for us so well.”
54.  “Who We Are,” Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization, https://www.ctbto.org/specials/who-we-are/.
55.  Joseph H. Beale, “The Jurisdiction of a Sovereign State,” Harvard Law Review 36 
(1923): 241, 245.
56.  UN Charter art. 39-51.
57.  “Russia, China Block Security Council Action On Use of Chemical Weapons in 
Syria,” UN News, February 28, 2017, https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/02/552362 
-russia-china-block-security-council-action-use-chemical-weapons-syria.
58.  Nigel Morris and Andrew Buncombe, “Libya Gives Up Nuclear and Chemical Weap-
ons,” Independent, December 20, 2003, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world 
/politics/libya-gives-up-nuclear-and-chemical-weapons-83350.html.
59.  Orde F. Kittrie, Averting Catastrophe: Why the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty Is Losing Its 
Deterrence Capacity and How to Restore It, Michigan Journal of International Law 28 (2007): 337, 
353.
60.  “This Day in History, December 13, 2003: Saddam Hussein Captured,” History, 
accessed January 1, 2019, https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/saddam-hussein 
-captured.
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scharf: So, in both of those cases there was US use of force. You were 
talking about reimposition of sanctions, but shouldn’t we also be talking about 
enforcement through force? What if North Korea cheats, the US could say, 
“Ah we gave them the chance, we entered into this treaty. They’ve cheated, 
and now we’re going to invade. Now we’re going to have forcible regime 
change?”
sterio: For the use of force in international law, there are basically only 
two situations when a country can legally use force against another sover-
eign country. Those two situations are Security Council authorization or 
self-defense.61 With Security Council authorization, the problem is we’re in 
this dynamic where Russia and China are often vetoing resolutions brought 
forth by the United States.62 With respect to North Korea, they might veto 
a resolution attempting to authorize the use of force against North Korea. 
In the other situation, self-defense, the United States would have to make 
the argument that North Korea, by not respecting the deal, whatever the 
deal is, is a threat to the United States and is about to somehow harm the 
United States. Then we can act in self-defense. That would have to be the 
legal argument. 
scharf: Well, does it strengthen that legal argument to say, “Look, we 
tried everything. We tried negotiating a treaty, and they cheated. They’ve 
got these nuclear weapons, and we feel like our security is at stake. We’ve 
tried everything reasonable that anyone could, so now we’re going to resort 
to force?” Does that strengthen the argument?
sterio: If you could make the argument that North Korea was actually 
threatening to use nuclear weapons against the United States. 
scharf: What about all those quotes I read just a moment ago? 
sterio: It depends on how seriously you’re going to take those quotes. 
Are they just posturing or are they actual, real threats against the United 
States? There are all sorts of creative self-defense arguments that have 
already been made by the United States. For example, with respect to the 
2003 invasion of Iraq, the United States made creative, sort of anticipa-
tory self-defense arguments based on Iraq’s alleged possession of chemical 
61.  UN Charter art. 4.
62.  Alexander Benard and Paul J. Leaf, “Modern Threats and The United Nations Security 
Council: No Time for Complacency (a Response to Professor Allen Weiner),” Stanford Law 
Review 62 (2010): 1395, 1396. 
13
Broadcasts: Talking Foreign Policy
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2019
125Talking Foreign Policy Transcripts
weapons.63 And you can certainly, you know, go there again. But, legally 
speaking, I think it would be a difficult argument.
scharf: So, we’ve been focusing on the nukes. But Paul and Tim, let me 
ask you—on the last broadcast of Talking Foreign Policy, we had former judge 
of the International Court of Justice, Tom Buergenthal, on the air with us. 
He compared North Korea to Nazi Germany in terms of its human rights 
abuses. If you remember, he said that he was part of a recent investigation 
of the human rights situation in North Korea.64 He said that the atrocities 
were worse than what happened to him when he was in a concentration 
camp during World War II in Nazi Germany. So, let me ask the two of you: 
Should the US be insisting, if we’re going to have talks with North Korea, 
that they include the human rights record as well as nukes?
williams: Yes. They clearly should. The Americans should be insisting 
that these human rights violations be included in the talks, and that mecha-
nisms be created in order to minimize or stop these human rights violations. 
We’re talking about mass starvation, concentration camps, extensive torture, 
and executions.65 But the reality is they won’t be included in the talks. The 
holy grail, so to speak, of these talks is a denuclearized Korean peninsula 
and normalization in one of the hottest areas in which we have a strategic 
interest. I don’t think that this administration is willing to put the human 
rights on the table for fear that it may scuttle a nuclear deal.66 Although, 
as others have pointed out, we’re not going to be able to have a long-term 
sustainable nuclear deal or sustainable relationship with North Korea with 
these ongoing starvations, mass killings, and mass torture. 
scharf: But, if there was a hierarchy of US national interests at play here, 
wouldn’t you say denuclearizing North Korea is way more important than 
achieving human rights for the people of North Korea? That that comes 
into play maybe a few years down the line after we’ve accomplished the 
more important goal? Could you make that argument?
63.  Chris Bordelon, The Illegality of the US Policy of Self-Defense Under International Law, 9 
Chapman Law Review 111 (2005): 111-112. 
64.  “Talking Foreign Policy: Jesner v. Arab Bank,” Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law, October 27, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oVD3Yify380andlist 
=PLOWPmlciK6gkZI-Xfuk0oBc9a3aRX2WMdandindex=3andt=66s.
65.  Maya Salam and Matthew Haag, “Atrocities Under Kim Jong Un: Indoctrination, 
Prison Gulags, Executions,” New York Times, June 11, 2018, https://www.nytimes 
.com/2018/06/11/world/asia/north-korea-human-rights.html.
66.  Harold Hongju Koh, The Foulston Seifkin Lecture: The Trump Administration and Interna-
tional Law, 56 Washburn L.J. 413, 431 (2017).
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webster: Sure. Certainly from an American perspective, the biggest 
threat is the nuclear threat. But if we’re talking about the twenty-two mil-
lion North Koreans that are living under this repressive regime, there are 
a separate set of strategies that need to be pursued. I would just add, and I 
agree with almost all that Paul said, that human rights isn’t something that 
Trump has expressed much interest in.67 Even prior presidencies, the Obama 
administration, the Clinton administration, and even George Bush—those 
were administrations that put a lot of emphasis on human rights. But if you 
go back and look at the agreements that they struck with North Korea, you 
never see the words “human rights.”68 So, it’s certainly a tool we can use, 
but if you go back, to echo what Paul said, when push comes to shove, what 
we’re focused on, what we really need to prioritize is the denuclearization. 
scharf: So, Shannon, you’re an ethicist. How does this strike you?
french: Well, I mean, one of the overall issues here is whether or not 
this is like negotiating with terrorists. And, as I think about that, and think 
about what’s on the table here, we’re talking about a bad actor who has not 
shown any signs of improving any of his actions. Now, we have to be realistic 
to some extent. There’s always a point—at least, we hope there will be a 
point—with most rogue or even terrorist regimes where they try to make 
a transition to be a legitimate political power. Finding that exact moment 
isn’t easy, and one of the trickier aspects of diplomacy is recognizing when 
the time is right for such a transition. Think about, for example, when the 
United Kingdom decided to start doing quiet negotiations with Sinn Féin 
and the IRA.69 But, if you begin down that route you have to realize it can’t 
be something that is a quick, early, public move that seems to legitimize the 
other party before they’ve begun to show improvements.70 And frankly, if we 
again look at history, the better approach seems to be to bring in third parties 
and have some early framework done where you stand off with some moral 
high ground to say “I can’t talk to them, obviously. But hey, my friends over 
here are going to quietly talk to you and see if you’re serious about making 
67.  Id.
68.  Gramer and Tamkin, supra note 2.
69.  James F. Clarity, “Sinn Fein is Invited by Britain to Join New Peace Talks,” New York 
Times, August 30, 1997, https://www.nytimes.com/1997/08/30/world/sinn-fein-is 
-invited-by-britain-to-join-new-peace-talks.html.
70.  David S. Jonas, The New US Approach to the Fissle Material Cutoff Treaty: Will Deletion of 
a Verification Regime Provide a Way out of the Wilderness?, Florida Journal of International Law 18 
(2006): 597, 646, 
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real change,” and build very slowly. I worry deeply, as an ethicist, about 
what kind of message we might be sending, not just to North Korea, but to 
the entire world, if we say “Oh! You want to talk? Well bygones. We’re not 
going to worry about anything you’ve done before. Let’s see where we can 
get from this point.” 
scharf: But at least the Trump administration’s position seems to be: 
“We will talk, and if you do not do what we want, then we will use force,” 
as opposed to past presidents that have said, “We will talk with you, and 
we will buy your cooperation with economic assistance.” There were 
agreements that we reached with North Korea by past administrations, 
where we gave them billions of dollars in economic assistance in return for 
their promise, which they didn’t keep, to get rid of the nuclear weapons.71 
Which of those two approaches do you think is more ethical? One where 
you tell them, “behave or we will hurt you” or one where we say, “We 
will make your lives very, very, good if you behave?” 
french: Well, I’m not a huge fan of either, because they’re both ways of 
negotiating with rogue or terrorist states. And I come back to the idea that 
they shouldn’t be given a seat at the table, until they make some moves and 
concessions. So, all of this is backwards. We’re starting with the, “If you will 
start to do something then these are the following consequences,” instead of 
just saying, “We’re going to sit here and wait for you to do something posi-
tive. Then, and only then, will we do anything meaningful.” And I would 
like to say that, even as I put that out there, that I don’t count as something 
positive some of these showy, but ultimately meaningless, moves by North 
Korea. Like the blowing up of these testing sites that can be reconstituted or 
might not be needed or were damaged anyway.72 That’s meaningless. That 
doesn’t impress me much.
scharf: Paul, let’s return to you to talk about the full range of carrots 
in the US arsenal of negotiations. In addition to just throwing money or 
threatening force, what other kinds of things are North Korea looking for 
with respect to a final peace negotiation?
71.  Glenn Kessler, “Fact-Checking President Trump’s Claims About the North Korea 
Deal,” Washington Post, June 13, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact 
-checker/wp/2018/06/13/fact-checking-president-trumps-claims-about-the-north-korea 
-deal/?utm_term=.d5db05d7e6c1.
72.  “North Korea Nuclear Test Tunnels at Punggye-ri ‘Destroyed,’” BBC, May 24, 2018, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44240047.
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williams: Well, one of the things that is quite often forgotten is that 
the North Koreans are quite interested in the reunification of the Korean 
Peninsula. Now, when we hear this we think, “Well, why would they be 
interested in reunification? That would simply be the south reincorporating 
the North to its dynamic capitalistic society and democratic structure.” 
But the North actually thinks it could govern all of Korea and could 
incorporate the South Koreans into the regime structure of the North.73 
It’s also about being a regional strategic player. At the moment, Kim is 
isolated. He’s the one that’s seen as the bad actor. But he sees a deal with 
the United States as a way of bringing him tremendous political power 
and prestige in the region. And I think that’s been under appreciated. And 
in particular, returning to Tim’s point, if he gets a summit, if he gets to 
sort of do the foxtrot with the United States, it’s of huge value. So, you 
blow up a few old labs and launch platforms, you say yet again that you’re 
going to denuclearize, and you get to go to Singapore for a summit and 
get a photo op. That’s going to add huge domestic and regional influence 
for Kim. And then there’s economic issues. 
scharf: Tim, Paul was talking about the reunification idea. This is not 
just the North’s idea. South Korea also very much wants reunification, isn’t 
that correct?
webster: Well, South Korea wants to reunify along the South Korean 
model.74 
scharf: Well, what if they decide to go ahead and negotiate a reunifica-
tion structure? Could the US block it? Should the US block it?
webster: No, the two Korean leaders could negotiate a reunification. 
But then they would be looking to the Americans to pay for it. It would 
be hugely expensive to bring the North Korean economic infrastructure 
into that of South Korea, and a huge drain on the South Korean economy.75 
So, we couldn’t block it, but we’d have to pay for it. 
73.  Kongdan Oh, “Understanding North Korea,” Brookings, April 1, 2013, https://www.
brookings.edu/articles/understanding-north-korea/.
74.  Eunice Lee, Operation ‘Denuclification’: A Proposal for the Reunification and Denucleariza-
tion of the Korean Peninsula, 33 Hastings Internationall and Comparative Law Review (2010): 
245, 272. 
75.  Tom Phillips, “Costly and Complicated: Why Many Koreans Can’t Face Reunifica-
tion,” The Guardian, October 9, 2015, 2:00 p.m., https://www.theguardian.com 
/world/2015/oct/09/why-many-koreans-cant-face-reunification. 
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scharf: Well, and then there are other aspects to this. The US has a 
lot of troops in South Korea to protect it from the North.76 Would the US 
have to pull those troops out as part of the agreement?
webster: The North Koreans are very clear that they want the American 
troops to leave in exchange for denuclearization.77 And the Americans are 
very clear that having our troops there is crucial to our military strategic 
interest, both on the Korean peninsula as well as in that part of Asia. It’s one 
of those catch-22s that is exceedingly difficult to navigate during negotiations. 
scharf: Well it’s time for another short break. When we return, we’ll talk 
about what the details of a negotiation between the US and North Korea 
would look like, and what’s at stake if the Summit is permanently shelved. 
 This is Michael Scharf, and we’re back with Talking Foreign Policy. I’m 
joined today by some of the foremost experts on negotiating with rogue 
nations. We’ve been talking about the prospects of a US-North Korean 
Summit. In this final segment of our broadcast, I want to ask our experts 
what advice they would have for the negotiators if, there was, in fact, a 
North Korea summit. But before we talk about what should be on the 
negotiating table, I’d like to ask Asian Affairs expert, Tim Webster: Who 
should be at the negotiating table? You had mentioned earlier that China 
and maybe Russia should play a part. Why?
webster: I’m not sure I would say Russia. I hope Russia is not invited 
to the party. But I think China, as the economic, security, and military 
guarantor of North Korea, has to be there. North Korea doesn’t exist without 
the economic lifeline of China. Whether you’re talking about trade, loans, 
investment, North Korea has to have China’s support to survive. And I 
think you also need to have South Korea at the table. At the end of April, 
North Korea and South Korea signed something called the Panmunjom 
Declaration,78 and they said “Look, going forward, these talks will either 
be three-party—North Korea, South Korea, US—or four-party—North 
Korea, South Korea, US, and China.” So, we need to understand that the 
76.  Tom Bowman, “Would the US Withdraw Troops from South Korea?” NPR, May 31, 
2018, 5:08 a.m., https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/05/31/615517016/would 
-the-u-s-withdraw-troops-from-south-korea.
77.  Id.
78.  “Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Penin-
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South Koreans obviously need to have a seat at the table for this to succeed. I 
think what’s gone unnoticed, at least in this country, is all the quiet backstage 
maneuvering that the current South Korean President, Moon Jae-in, has done 
to get us this far. So, if there is a summit it didn’t come about because Trump 
talks big—it was made possible because South Korean President Moon Jae-in 
has been working like a madman. You know, go back to the Olympics and 
the impressive diplomatic coup d’état he pulled off by having the South and 
the North on the same team together, for the women’s ice hockey team, 
and inviting North Korean leaders down to participate in the ceremonies. 
Those efforts I think, and even coming to Washington to council President 
Trump earlier this week, are what made the difference. So, South Korea, 
of course, needs to be at the table. It wants denuclearization as well, but as 
we talked about, there are a whole range of other issues South Korea would 
want to address in these kinds of talks.79 I think four-party talks involving 
those four actors are probably the best. I think Russia is going to be a spoiler. 
Six-party talks also included Japan. There is a role, I suppose, for Japan here. 
In previous manifestations, Japan has played the role of economic advisor.80 
Japan would be there to fund the peaceful nuclear reactors that North Korea 
would ultimately get. But I think either three- or four-party talks are really 
the way to move forward on this. 
scharf: So, Paul Williams in the last three years you’ve been shuttling back 
and forth to Geneva for the peace talks regarding Syria, and those peace talks 
are multi-party talks. Based on that experience, what can you tell our listeners 
about the pros and cons of bilateral talks versus the multi-party approach?
williams: Well, bilateral talks are a lot easier, you can control half of the 
agenda, you can control half of the negotiations because you’re one of two 
parties. When you need to develop a strategy, you only need to get your 
team to come to an agreement on that strategy which, as we’ve seen with 
the preparations for this potential summit, it’s exceedingly difficult just to 
get your own team, your own secretary of state, your own national security 
advisor, to agree upon what are your priorities, what’s the negotiation process 
going to look like. Tim’s right, you do have to involve the Chinese, probably 
the Japanese, definitely the South Koreans, but that makes it exceedingly 
difficult, because it’s essentially the North Koreans on one side negotiating 
with the four other members across the table, and that makes it much more 
79.  Suzy Kim, “Crossing Borders: A Feminist History of “Women Cross DMZ,” Fletcher 
Forum of World Affairs 40 (2016): 133, 144.
80.  Lee, supra note 74. 
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difficult to get to “yes” and to get to “yes” effectively where your priorities 
are on the table, because the Chinese, the Japanese, the South Koreans, and 
the Americans don’t all have the same priorities.81 They do big-picture—
denuclearization82—but in terms of a number of the other issues, there’s 
complete disagreement between the Americans and definitely the Chinese,83 
and there is even daylight between the US position and that of our allies the 
South Koreans and the Japanese.84 So, it’s going to be complicated enough, 
and that only makes it more multi-dimensional. 
scharf: So, when you’re talking about complicated peace negotiations, 
how all-important do you think it is that the negotiating team have a lot 
of experience?
williams: Well it’s . . .  
scharf: Do you think that’s a loaded question?
williams: That’s a loaded question. This is not the same as negotiating 
a real estate deal. I think this is part of the dilemma that we’re facing here is 
we have a president who is very effective at a certain type of negotiation and 
a certain process and that’s what they’ve, you know, the tweets that you read 
earlier, the let’s go mano a mano, let’s meet in Singapore, let’s hash something 
out, that’s how you buy a hotel; it’s not how you denuclearize a country. I 
think what we’re going to have to have, and I think there’s people on the 
team that can do this, is a clear set of priorities, a clear understanding of the 
timeline. It could take several years of intermediate steps to denuclearize the 
Korean peninsula;85 it won’t happen quickly. And you’re going to need a very 
81.  Jane Perlez, “Talks With North Korea? China Approves (No Matter the Outcome),” 
New York Times, March 7, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/07/world/asia/north 
-korea-china-talks.html.
82.  Kiyoshi Takenaka and Nobuhiro Kubo, “China, Japan, and South Korea Highlight 
Unity Amid North Korea Moves,” Reuters, May 8, 2018, 8:20 p.m., https://www.reuters 
.com/article/us-japan-summit/china-japan-and-south-korea-highlight-unity-amid-north 
-korea-moves-idUSKBN1IA01T.
83.  Eleanor Albert, “The China-North Korea Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, 
updated March 28, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea 
-relationship. 
84.  Josh Smith, “Differing Views of ‘Denuclearization’ Complicate North Korea Talks,” 
Reuters, March 28, 2018, 4:05 a.m., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea 
-missiles-denuclearisation/differing-views-of-denuclearization-complicate-north-korea 
-talks-idUSKBN1H40YI. 
85.  Kelly Kasulis, “What It Will Take to Denuclearize North Korea,” Public Radio Interna-
tional, May 4, 2018, 7:45 a.m., https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-05-04/what-it-will-take 
-denuclearize-north-korea. 
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detailed follow-on negotiation process, we keep talking about the summit, the 
two folks getting together and hammering something out beyond just shutting 
down the reactors. What do you do with the existing nuclear material and 
missiles, and then who’s going to pay for it? The Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty with the USSR cost the Americans two billion dollars to help the 
Russians get rid of some of their nuclear weapons, and it has cost another half 
a billion over the last ten years to monitor.86 Are we going to pay for this?
scharf: Paul, how difficult do you think it makes for successful negotia-
tions that the US doesn’t currently have an ambassador to Korea, there’s no 
current US assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific, there’s 
no State Department expert on North Korea, that person just retired, I 
believe there’s no arms control expert—a big chunk of the experts who 
normally would be involved in these kinds of negotiations have not been 
appointed.87 How difficult is that going to make successful negotiations?
williams: Okay, let’s be honest, this is a real test of President Trump’s 
mantra of “we’ve been getting it wrong before, there’s a new sheriff in 
town, we’re going to do things differently.” So, if you were to list off these 
positions to the top officials on the Trump team they’d shrug their shoulders 
and say “yeah, yeah, but those are the guys, those are the positions, those 
are the institutional interests that brought us the last twenty years of failed 
policy in North Korea; we need fresh ideas, we need a new dynamic, we 
need a new process.” I think we’re going to find that it’s not as easy as just 
bringing in a new team with fresh ideas, that the depth of knowledge that’s 
required to denuclearize the Korean peninsula is substantial, and without 
that knowledge, and I think this recent sort of push back or this abrogation 
of the summit is an example of that, it’s like, wow, this actually is more 
complicated than just negotiating over Twitter. 
scharf: Well we do have John Bolton. Now, let me remind the listeners 
about John Bolton, he is someone with a lot of experience during both the 
86.  Susan Willett, “Costs of Disarmament—Disarming the Costs: Nuclear Arms Control 
and Nuclear Rearmament,” UN Institute for Disarmament Research, UN Doc. UNI-
DIR/2003/25 (2003), http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/costs-of 
-disarmament-disarming-the-costs-nuclear-arms-control-and-nuclear-rearmament 
-306.pdf.
87.  Hyonhee Shin and David Brunnstorm, “US Envoy for North Korea to Retire After 
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senior and younger Bush administrations; he was assistant secretary of state 
for International Organization Affairs, he was ambassador to the United 
Nations, and he was deputy secretary of state.88 So, this is a man with a lot 
of experience that has now been made the new national security advisor 
to the president.89 Any of our panelists, what do you think the entrance of 
John Bolton into this calculus means? Tim?
webster: Sure, so another fact about John Bolton is that during his time 
with the younger Bush administration, the US presented evidence to the 
world that North Korea was not abiding by the framework that the Clinton 
administration had agreed to in 1994, and John Bolton rather triumphantly 
said “Aha, this is the hammer I have been searching for to destroy this 
agreement.”90 So John Bolton is the guy on the Bush team who killed the 
first North Korea deal that had been in place at that time for eight years. So 
you have that aspect, you also have his comments last week about aspiring 
to a Libya model.91 We already talked about what happened to Mu’ammar 
Gaddhafi earlier in the program, we don’t need to revisit that, but that wasn’t 
a particularly helpful way to advance discussions with North Korea, especially 
given North Korea’s support for Gaddhafi at the time.92 
scharf: In a way, you’re being almost too diplomatic in describing this. 
I think that one could say that John Bolton’s statements about the Libya 
model fueled the response of Kim, which directly led to the president’s 
announcement on May 24 that he was pulling out of the talks. 
sterio: It started with John Bolton, but then also Mike Pence had said 
some things about that, basically referring to the Libya model which, from 
the North Korean perspective, is certainly not a good model because, again 
as I explained earlier, although you could make the argument that Gaddhafi 
in 2003 agreed to a regime of inspection and verification, and perhaps even 
abided by the terms of that deal, ultimately there was a regime change in 
88.  John Bolton, The White House, (2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/people/john-r 
-bolton/.
89.  Id.
90.  Ankit Panda, “John Bolton Enters the Trump Administration: What to Expect,” Diplo-
mat, March 23, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/john-bolton-enters-the-trump 
-administration-what-to-expect/.
91.  “Transcript: National Security Adviser John Bolton on ‘Face the Nation,’” CBS News, 
April 29, 2018, 10:30 a.m., https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-national-security 
-adviser-john-bolton-on-face-the-nation-april-29-2018/.
92.  Ian Traynor, “North Korean Nuclear Trade Exposed,” Guardian News and Media, May 
23, 2004, 9:20 p.m., https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/may/24/northkorea.libya.
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Libya—his regime was toppled and this resulted in his death.93 So if you’re 
North Korea, you’re looking at this, you see that people like John Bolton 
and Mike Pence are referring to this, you certainly would not be rushing 
to a summit in Singapore.94
scharf: But wasn’t this actually a giant misunderstanding? Pence, I 
think, described it one way, but that’s not really what Bolton meant by 
the Libya model, is it?
sterio: I think Bolton was actually referring just to the 2003 agreement 
where Libya actually agreed to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction.95 
So, I think Bolton was looking at it as like, this can actually be done, this 
was done once before and an authoritarian regime agreed to essentially 
destroy its arsenal.
scharf: And then it was Pence who then spun it and said this means 
if you don’t comply, we have a regime change, and that got things off.96
sterio: Exactly, and that’s when the North Korean Vice Minister for 
Foreign Affairs called Pence stupid and ignorant, and then this basically 
sparked Trump’s response to say this is now cancelled.97
williams: Michael, if I could just jump in real quick, I think this high-
lights some of the concerns that those of us around the microphone have 
been expressing. I think Bolton made a serious effort at saying that there’s 
a Libya model; in 2003 they agreed, by 2004 the Libyans were shipping the 
components of their weapons program to the United States in exchange for 
economic inducements and economic trade,98 and that was actually work-
ing. Completely separate from that, there was the 2011 revolution in Libya, 
93.  Rick Noack, “How Kim-Trump Tensions Escalated: The More the US Said ‘Libya,’ the 
Angrier North Korea Got,” Washington Post, May 24, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/news/world/wp/2018/05/24/the-more-pence-and-trump-say-libya-the-angrier 
-north-korea-gets/?utm_term=.884e38b5f3b3.
94.  Rick Noack, “A Timeline of North Korea’s Backtracking on Denuclearization Talks,” 
Washington Post, May 16, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world 
/wp/2018/05/16/a-timeline-of-north-koreas-backtracking-on-denuclearization 
-talks/?utm_term=.748bf94b35e2.
95.  Noack, “How Kim-Trump Tensions Escalated,” supra note 93.
96.  Sophie Tatum and James Griffiths, “Pence: North Korea Will End Like Libya Only if 
‘Kim Jong Un Doesn’t Make a Deal,’” CNN, updated May 22, 2018, 3:26 a.m., https://
www.cnn.com/2018/05/21/politics/mike-pence-fox-news-north-korea/index.html.
97.  Noack, “How Kim-Trump Tensions Escalated,” supra note 93.
98.  Barry Schweid, “Libya Ships Nuclear Parts to US,” CBS, February 20, 2004, 1:51 p.m., 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/libya-ships-nuclear-parts-to-us/.
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which led to the regime change and the killing of Gaddhafi by his own 
people. I think Bolton was essentially saying “Look, if we are going to do 
this, here’s a roadmap,” and then others in the administration who didn’t 
actually grasp what had happened in 2003–2004 heard Libya and thought, 
“Regime change, yeah let’s go that model.” And now we have, as Milena 
laid out, it’s falling apart. Because the core team did not understand that 
there are two parts, that there’s a Libya model for denuclearization and then 
there’s the Libyan revolution—completely different, completely unrelated. 
That lack of sophistication has crippled, at least in the short-term, what was 
going to be a summit to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.
scharf: But maybe not, everything the President tweets or says today 
doesn’t mean it’s going to be his position tomorrow. Paul, isn’t it possible 
that this is just another bargaining ploy by President Trump and that we’ll 
be back at the table maybe not on June 12, but soon thereafter?
williams: It’s not a bargaining ploy, it’s stalling for time. I think there 
was a realization that this is exceedingly complicated, that shockingly, our 
team, Team America, is not prepared for this, and that the misunderstanding 
and recriminations have created an opportunity to basically pause and get 
our act together. The North Koreans have been preparing for this bilateral 
engagement for a really long time. We’ve been preparing for two weeks, 
and this gives us a couple more weeks maybe to prepare and come up with 
an actual plan. 
scharf: Alright, so there’s some optimism that this is not the end of the 
talks. Shannon, let me go the other route, though, with you and do a thought 
experiment. What do you think would happen if the talks are permanently 
cancelled? 
french: Well, I think first of all, as we’ve already experienced, we’ll 
see a return to very angry rhetoric on both sides, but the other things that 
I think that will happen are most likely that South Korea isn’t going to just 
give this up, so South Korea will probably try to restart the negotiations with 
the North and perhaps play off what has happened with the US as a way to 
come closer to the North or make some arrangements there. We’ll probably 
see more nuclear testing by Kim Jong Un as again a way of acting out in 
response to that, but there are other things we can expect, like a decline in 
US-China relations, even further. And one thing that I’m aware of from my 
travels to Japan is there has already been a lot of increased political pressure 
24
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in Japan to amp up their move toward rearming99 and they’ve even started 
talking about how quickly could they become nuclear.100 In light of that kind 
of a breakdown, and Japan is already feeling a sense of insecurity around 
whether they are truly protected anymore by the US, I think it would be 
reasonable for that worry to reemerge, that Japan is going to say, “Look we 
can’t count on anyone, we need to make sure that we have that precious 
nuclear umbrella, too.”
scharf: Well, let’s take this scenario to the extreme. Shannon you’re the 
author of a book titled The Code of the Warrior.101 Let’s assume that things 
go off the rails completely, as Milena said there’s maybe a legal argument 
the US can make for use of force, and if we do use force, what does that 
kind of military engagement look like? What are the casualties likely to be?
french: Well this is where it gets truly horrific, and I think that Secretary 
of Defense Mattis made the point with a single word; he said that if we got 
into a military conflict with North Korea it would be “catastrophic.”102 
But just to make that real, there are the obvious targets—barracks, troop 
concentrations, artillery, nuclear facilities, command and control, all of 
that can be predicted. But what we need to talk about is the human cost, 
and in late 2017, the Department of Defense itself did an estimate of what 
that human cost might be, and it estimated as a very conservative number 
around twenty to thirty thousand dead per day.103 As high as six figures 
have been discussed.104 There are one hundred thousand Americans in 
South Korea, both military and civilian.105 So what we’re talking about 
99.  Nobuhiro Kubo and Kiyoshi Takenaka, “Japan Urges Pressure on North Korea, Mili-
tary to Seek Record Defense Spending,” Reuters, August 22, 2017, 3:40 a.m., https://www 
.reuters.com/article/us-japan-diplomacy-minister-iduskcn1b20n4.
100.  Liubomir K. Topaloff, “Japan’s Nuclear Moment,” Diplomat, April 21, 2017, https://
thediplomat.com/2017/04/japans-nuclear-moment/.
101.  Shannon E. French, The Code of the Warrior: Exploring Warrior Values Past and Present, 
(Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
102.  Dakshayani Shankar, “Mattis: War with North Korea Would Be ‘Catastrophic,’” ABC 
News, August 10, 2017, 8:53 p.m., https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/mattis-war-north 
-korea-catastrophic/story?id=49146747.
103.  Barbara Demick, “Escalating Tension Has Experts Simulating a New Korean War, 
and the Scenarios Are Sobering,” Los Angeles. Times, September 25, 2017, 3:00 a.m., http://
www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-korean-war-20170925-story.html.
104.  Franz-Stefan Gady, “What Would the Second Korean War Look Like?” Diplomat, 
April 19, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/what-would-the-second-korean-war 
-look-like/.
105.  Kim Chul-Soo, “Number of US citizens Living in South Korea Rises 30 Percent in 
10 Years,” Korea Times, July 2, 2015, http://www.koreatimesus.com/number-of-us-citizens 
-living-in-south-korea-rises-30-percent-in-10-years/.
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here in real human terms is, to make a local reference, within ten days the 
equivalent of the population of Cincinnati would be dead. This cannot 
be a light decision. 
scharf: Alright, so with that in mind, I’m much more optimistic that 
we’re going to end up seeing the two countries get back to the peace table. 
french: I certainly hope so. 
scharf: This may be, as Paul said, just a stall while the US gets its act 
together. Tim, if these talks are eventually held, what do you think the 
benchmarks for gauging their success should be? 
webster: Obviously we need to have some plan that lays out with admi-
rable detail the steps toward complete denuclearization. That’s a very long, 
multiple stage process, but something that spells out step-by-step, US does 
this, North Korea does this, US does this, North Korea does this, and so 
on and so forth. And I think the clearer the picture you have of what each 
step means, the likelier you are that both parties will actually fulfill that. 
We’ve had an agreement before with North Korea in 1994, as I mentioned, 
but immediately after it was signed, you had the Republican revolution, 
you had Newt Gingrich coming into town, and everybody including John 
McCain criticizing Clinton for going ahead with it.106 So, if we can have 
some agreement on what the steps will be, a timeline perhaps, or some other 
very clear roadmap that spells out how we get to complete denuclearization, 
that I think is what we should be looking for. Then, of course, the other 
bugbear here is the implementation itself, and as Paul mentioned, it would 
be a many year timeline, and it’s difficult, I think, for our politicians to think 
along those long timeframes. 
scharf: Well the stakes could not be higher for the eventual US-North 
Korea Summit, which I think we all hope will eventually take place. 
We need to wrap up our program now. Paul Williams, Shannon French, 
Milena Sterio, and Tim Webster, thank you all for providing your insights 
about the prospects and pitfalls for a summit between the United States 
and one of its oldest adversaries. I’m Michael Scharf, you’ve been listening 
to Talking Foreign Policy. 
106.  “Mr. McCain’s Risky Korea Strategy,” New York Times, October 27, 1994, https://
www.nytimes.com/1994/10/27/opinion/mr-mccain-s-risky-korea-strategy.html. 
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scharf: Welcome to Talking Foreign Policy, I’m your host, Michael Scharf,2 
dean of Case Western Reserve University School of Law. In this broadcast, 
our expert panelists will be discussing the issue of responding to rogue 
states. For our program today, we’ve assembled a panel of experts on peace 
negotiations, national security, human rights, and war crimes. Joining 
Talking Foreign Policy for the first time is Todd Buchwald, who served as the 
State Department’s Ambassador for Global Criminal Justice and Assistant 
Legal Adviser for UN Affairs, and he is currently a fellow at the Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars.3 I’ve known the ambassador since 
we worked together at the State Department twenty-five years ago, so I 
will dispense with the formalities and just say: Welcome to our show, Todd.
buchwald: Great to be here.
scharf: And we are also joined by another new guest, James Johnson,4 
who served as Chief of Prosecutions of the Special Court of Sierra Leone 
after a two-decade career in the US JAG Corps. He is currently the director 
of the War Crimes Research Office at Case Western Reserve University. 
Welcome Jim.
1.  Transcript edited and footnotes added by Cox Center Fellows Nicole Divittorio, 
George Kamanda, Alexandria McKenna, and Alex Lilly.
2.  Michael Scharf, Case Western Reserve School of Law, https://law.case.edu/Our 
-School/Faculty-Staff/Meet-Our-Faculty/Faculty-Detail/id/142. Michael Scharf is the 
dean of Case Western Reserve University School of Law. He has also written and pub-
lished extensively in the area of international law. 
3.  Todd F. Buchwald, US Department of State, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei 
/biog/251248.htm. Prior to becoming a career lawyer in the Department’s Office of the 
Legal Advisor, Ambassador Buchwald served in the Office of White House Counsel and as 
an associate at Washington law firm Wilmer, Cutler, and Pickering.
4.  Jim Johnson, Case Western Reserve School of Law, https://law.case.edu/Our-School 
/Faculty-Staff/Adjunct-Faculty. Jim Johnson served as Chief of Prosecutions of the Special 
Court of Sierra Leone after a two-decade career in the Jag Corps. He is currently the 
director of the War Crimes Research Office at Case Western Reserve University. 
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johnson: Thank you, Michael. 
scharf: And we have two Talking Foreign Policy regulars back with us 
today. First, Dr. Paul Williams,5 the president of the Public International 
Law and Policy Group, a Nobel Peace Prize nominated NGO that has 
provided legal counsel in a dozen peace negotiations over the past twenty-
two years. Welcome back to the show, Paul.
williams: Michael, it’s great to be back.
scharf: And also with us in the WCPN 90.3 Ideastream Studio is 
Professor Milena Sterio,6 who is the associate dean of Cleveland Marshall 
College of Law and a renowned international law expert. It’s good to have 
you back on the program, Milena.
sterio: It is great to be here, Michael.
scharf: So, let me kick things off by asking Ambassador Todd Buch-
wald—how would you define a rogue state?
buchwald: Well, it’s very interesting. It’s not really a legal term and it 
doesn’t really have a fixed meaning.7 For the most part, it’s been used as a way 
to talk about states that don’t abide by norms on nonproliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction and terrorism.8 That’s the way it was used early on by the 
Clinton administration; though, at some point, the Clinton administration 
made a concerted effort to stop using the word because they thought it was 
interfering with their ability to conduct diplomacy with countries on the list, 
5.  Paul Williams, American University Washington College of Law, https://www.wcl 
.american.edu/community/faculty/profile/pwilliams/bio. Paul Williams is a professor at 
American University Washington College of Law. He is also the president of the Public 
International Law and Policy Group, a Nobel Peace Prize nominated NGO that has pro-
vided legal counsel in a dozen of peace negotiations over the past twenty-two years.
6.  Milena Sterio, Cleveland Marshall College of Law, https://www.law.csuohio.edu 
/newsevents/featuredfaculty/milena-sterio. Milena Sterio is the associate dean of Cleveland 
Marshall College of Law and a renowned international law expert. 
7.  The definition of “rogue states” is not fixed. It once referred to states that had “failed 
to adhere to the rule of law.” Now, “it has become an elastic catchphrase that is used to 
demonize behavior and rally political support.” Robert S. Litwak, “A Look At…Rogue 
States,” Washington Post, February 20, 2000, https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/archive/opinions/2000/02/20/a-look-at-rogue-states/62a19e42-433d-4915-9bbc 
-97c5b900603e/?utm_term=.09419533d376.
8.  “Post-Cold War Policy—Isolating and Punishing “Rogue States,’” Encyclopedia of Ameri-
can Foreign Policy 2019, http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/Post-cold 
-War-Policy-Isolating-and-punishing-rogue-states.html.
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like North Korea, who they engaged with.9 In the Bush administration, it 
came to be used in association with the famous Axis of Evil countries. Again, 
it was about terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.10 There was sort of a 
background noise to the whole thing—that you might be a target for regime 
change at some point—in the air. That was in the Bush administration. In 
the Trump administration, President Trump used the term when he spoke 
to the UN General Assembly last year, and he added Venezuela to the list.11 
And that was interesting because it’s a different kind of rogue state. I mean, 
one can easily see that it’s not a very comfortable state to deal with. But it 
was different in the sense that unlike most of the [rogue] states, its rogueness 
was directed internally rather than externally. So, that’s the way it’s used. I 
think, by and large, the term is still about externally directed threats.12
scharf: I think you have coined a new phrase that we may be using 
today, “rogueness.” So, based on the rogueness criteria, let me ask our 
expert panel: Which countries in the world do you all consider to be rogue 
states?13 Todd, let’s start with you. What would be on your list?
buchwald: I still tend to think of the states as the security threats. 
The security rogues. Maybe because of my background as an international 
lawyer, those are the states that tend to have the more immediate . . . 
scharf: So, the worst ones on your list would be?
buchwald: Well, the worst ones on the executive branch’s list would 
still be Iran . . . you would have thought North Korea; there’s sort of a strange 
relationship now with North Korea. But, those two are probably at the top 
of the list.
scharf: Paul, what would you add?
9.  Robert S. Litwak, “A Look At…Rogue States,” Washington Post, February 20, 2000, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2000/02/20/a-look-at-rogue 
-states/62a19e42-433d-4915-9bbc-97c5b900603e/?utm_term=.09419533d376.
10.  Massimo Calabresi, “The Axis of Evil is it For Real?,” Time, February 3, 2002, http://
content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,198894,00.html.
11.  Remarks by President Donald Trump to the 72nd Session of the United Nations 
General Assembly, September19, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements 
/remarks-president-trump-72nd-session-united-nations-general-assembly/.
12.  Robert S. Litwak, “A Look At…Rogue States,” Washington Post, February 20, 2000, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2000/02/20/a-look-at-rogue 
-states/62a19e42-433d-4915-9bbc-97c5b900603e/?utm_term=.09419533d376.
13.  Robert Rotberg, “The Threat from Rogue States,” Boston Globe, November 6, 2004, 
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/threat-rogue-states.
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williams: Oh, I would definitely keep North Korea on the list, and then I 
would add the triumvirate of Syria, Sudan, and Burma, or Myanmar, as they 
like to be called. All highly destabilizing both internally and externally.14
scharf: And Milena, what would you put on the list?
sterio: For some historical perspective, you might go back to, for exam-
ple, Libya under Gaddhafi15—certainly at the end of that regime. And I 
certainly agree with both Paul and Todd regarding their lists. You might go 
back and say Serbia or the FRY—Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—under 
Milošević, as well.16
scharf: But not currently in either of those cases?
sterio: Not currently.
scharf: Okay, and Jim: Is there anything we are leaving off?
johnson: Well, I think that I might add—I don’t think Paul mentioned 
it—Yemen. I think I might add Yemen to that list.
scharf: Okay. So, what about Cuba? Would any of you put Cuba on 
that list? Todd?
buchwald: It is a funny kind of list to be put on because you don’t 
know what it is that happens when you’re on it. I think the relationship with 
Cuba, probably at this point, has a highly political dimension to it—but 
I think it really is a little bit different from the other states on the list.17
scharf: What about Turkey? Things are getting pretty out of control 
in our relations with Turkey.18 Would you put them on the list, anybody?
sterio: I wouldn’t. When I think of rogue states, I also think of states 
that are willing to, essentially, flagrantly act “roguely.” That might be a new 
word, too.
14.  Id. 
15.  David E. Sanger and Judith Miller, “Libya to Give Up Arms Programs, Bush 
Announces,” New York Times, December 20, 2003, https://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/20 
/world/libya-to-give-up-arms-programs-bush-announces.html.
16.  See Michael P. Scharf, “The Indictment of Slobodan Milosevic,” ASIL Insights 4:3 June 
5, 1999, https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/4/issue/3/indictment-slobodan-milosevic.
17.  Claire Felter and Danielle Renwick, US-Cuba Relations, Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, January 19, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-cuba-relations.
18.  Colin Dwyer and Larry Kaplow, “What’s the Deal with The Deepen-
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scharf: So, like, invading another country, sending Internet attacks 
into other countries . . . 
sterio: Invading another country, using chemical weapons, and things 
of that sort. 
scharf: What about Russia?
sterio: Well, Russia actually is very good at using international law 
rhetoric to justify its actions. Russia doesn’t stand up and say, “Oh we don’t 
care about international law.”
scharf: So, is a rogue state only one that says, “We don’t care about the 
rules?”
sterio: Well, the other difference I think is if we are defining “rogue-
ness,” are we talking about it from the United States perspective, or are we 
talking about it from some objective, global perspective?
scharf: What’s the difference?
sterio: Well, there is a difference. There are states that are clearly threats, 
perhaps, to the US. And when we talk about, for example, Turkey, you 
might say, “Okay, US-Turkey relations are really at a low point right now. 
But from a global perspective, I don’t think Turkey is on the same level as 
Syria, for example, or some of these other states.”
scharf: Okay. So, focusing on those states that are threats to the United 
States that you’ve listed. Paul Williams: Why should the US care, particularly 
about these countries?
williams: Well, I think, Michael, there are two reasons why the United 
States should care about rogue states. The first is that they directly impact 
our security. The United States has security interests woven throughout the 
globe, and when you have states—either by the strict definition of rejecting 
the norms relating to terrorism, or as the broader definition of “rogueness” 
that we seem to be establishing here—this impacts our ability to maintain 
the security of the United States and our allies.19 So, for instance, with 
North Korea and its nuclear weapons, you know it has the ability to anni-
hilate South Korea and Japan and possibly the ability to strike the United 
19.  Mara Karlin, “After 7 Years of War, Assad has Won in Syria: What’s Next for Washing-
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States. Syria is pushing millions of refugees into Lebanon, Jordon, Turkey 
and into Europe—it’s highly destabilizing.20 Turkey might not be rogue, 
but is certainly on the verge of being destabilized, and there are security 
consequences.21 So, the states acting outside the bounds of the normative 
structure that the Americans have worked for over the decades to create 
substantially impacts our interests. Second, I think it’s important to add that 
if they impact their own populations as well, that’s also something Ameri-
cans used to—and should continue to—care about. Burma has pushed out 
seven hundred thousand of their own civilians into Bangladesh. And some 
would call this—what they’ve been doing—genocide.22 This is something 
that may not impact our security interests, but we should care about it.
scharf: Okay, so with most of the countries we have been talking 
about, it’s the government itself that is acting roguish. What about those 
countries where there are terrorists, or rebels, or pirates that are operating 
freely because they are failed states? Milena, do you think there is a differ-
ence between a rogue state and a failed state?
sterio: Sure. I think definitely there is a difference, as you correctly 
stated. Most of these rogue states that we just mentioned are ruled by gov-
ernments that have effective control over the territory of those states. A few 
years ago, maybe Syria was in a different category, but right now President 
Assad has control over most of the Syrian territory.23 Other presidents of 
the states that we have mentioned have control over their territory. A failed 
state, to the contrary, is a state where the government no longer exercises 
effective control over their territory, which then allows groups like non-
state actors, terrorists, pirates, rebels, and narco-traffickers to operate with 
impunity.24 And the classical example of a failed state would be Somalia, 
20.  Kemal Kirişci, Jessica Brandt, and M. Murat Erdoğan, “Syrian Refugees in Turkey: 
Beyond the Numbers,” Brookings Institution, June 19, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu 
/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/06/19/syrian-refugees-in-turkey-beyond-the-numbers/.
21.  Sebnem Koser Akcapar, “Turkey Stands Between Europe and the Next Refugee Cri-
sis,” New York Times, September 25, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/25/opinion 
/syria-idlib-refugees-turkey-war-erdogan-putin-assad.html. 
22.  “Myanmar Rohingya: What You Need to Know About the Crisis,” BBC, April 24, 
2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561.
23.  Mara Karlin, “After 7 Years of War, Assad has Won in Syria: What’s Next for Washing-
ton?,” Brookings Institution, February 13, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog 
/order-from-chaos/2018/02/13/after-7-years-of-war-assad-has-won-in-syria-whats-next 
-for-washington/.
24.  Failed States, Global Policy Forum, accessed November 1, 2018, https://www 
.globalpolicy.org/nations-a-states/failed-states.html.
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where—about ten years ago—pirates were basically free to roam because 
there was no effective government oversight.25
scharf: So, whether we are talking about a failed state or a rogue state, 
let me ask the ambassador: When is it better for the US to act in concert 
with others through the UN or NATO, and when do you feel it’s necessary 
for the United States to consider acting on its own?
buchwald: Well, I think in principle, it’s always better to act with others 
and in as large a coalition as possible. If you have this picture of a rogue state 
as a state that is playing out of the accepted lines, if you’re in concert with 
others, it’s clear you’re able to more clearly demonstrate where those lines 
are. So, if we’re the only one saying, “You’re playing outside the lines,” it 
doesn’t resonate nearly as much as if the entire international community 
makes that claim. Now, when you talk about the international community, 
it’s a concept; you can’t touch the international community. You could be 
talking about the UN General Assembly or the UN Security Council; if 
it’s a situation in Europe, you could be talking about NATO.26 There are 
times, however, when it won’t be possible to act multilaterally, and I think 
the United States will always reserve to itself at least the prospect of acting 
unilaterally, if for no other reason than you have to reserve that prospect 
as part of the campaign of building a multilateral coalition.
scharf: And I think you’re mostly talking about use of economic sanc-
tions and use of force. Let me turn to Jim Johnson. As an international 
prosecutor, when should prosecution of leaders of rogue states be considered 
and pursued?
johnson: Well, first, Michael, let me just state that your question assumes 
that there might be an international tribunal or some judicial body that is 
capable of carrying out a prosecution. Unfortunately, in many instances—
you look around the world today—with leaders this may not be the case. But 
there is clearly the precedent developed by Nuremberg and reinforced by 
modern tribunals that makes it clear: war crimes and crimes against human-
ity are committed by individuals. As a head of state, you are responsible; 
and, as a head of state, you have no immunity from international crimes. 
So, indeed, you can be prosecuted. And when you’re looking at when you 
25.  Hassan Barise, “Somalia—Where Pirates Roam Free,” BBC, November 11, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4424264.stm.
26.  Ian Black, “NATO Alerted to Dangers of Rogue States,” Guardian, November 1, 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/27/afghanistan.terrorism20.
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should be prosecuted—I’m a prosecutor and that’s first and foremost in my 
mind—I believe that when there are reasonable grounds to believe that a 
leader has committed a war crime or crime against humanity, that action 
should be taken toward the prosecution of that leader. Beyond that, you 
also are going to want to look at the gravity of the crimes that have been 
committed. The location of the victims is also relevant. Are they internal 
or external? These are some of the kinds of things that you look at, I think, 
when you are prosecuting a leader.
scharf: Well, we are almost out of time for our first segment. When we 
return, we will focus our discussion on the case study of Syria, the greatest 
humanitarian crisis facing the world in the last decade.27 We’ll be back in 
just a moment.
 Welcome back to Talking Foreign Policy, brought to you by Case Western 
Reserve University and WCPN 90.3 Ideastream. I’m Michael Scharf, the 
dean of the Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I’m joined today 
by the former US Ambassador for Global Criminal Justice, Todd Buchwald; 
the international prosecutor who convicted Liberian president Charles Taylor 
for war crimes, Jim Johnson; famed peace negotiator, Dr. Paul Williams of 
the Public International Law and Policy group; and an international law 
guru, Associate Dean Milena Stereo of Cleveland Marshall College of Law. 
We are talking today about the challenges of responding to rogue states. 
In this segment of our show, I’d like to focus the group’s attention on the 
crisis in Syria. Since the beginning of the civil war there in 2011, the Assad 
regime has killed and displaced millions of people, and on several occasions 
the regime has used chemical weapons in opposition-controlled areas. Syria 
has become the greatest humanitarian crisis of our time.28 Let me begin by 
asking Ambassador Todd Buchwald: Why hasn’t the UN Security Council 
been able to take action to respond to the growing crisis in Syria?
buchwald: Under the UN Charter, if the Security Council takes a 
decision, all UN member states—basically every country in the world—is 
under a legal obligation to accept and carry out the decision.29 That’s Article 
27.  “Syria: The Biggest Humanitarian Crisis of Our Time,” Amnesty International, Novem-
ber 1, 2018, https://www.amnesty.org.nz/take-action/syria-crisis.
28.  Eyder Peralta, “UN: Syrian Crisis Is ‘Biggest Humanitarian Emergency of Our Era,’” 
NPR, August 29, 2014, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/08 
/29/344219323/u-n-syrian-refugee-crisis-is-biggest-humanitarian-emergency-of-our-era.
29.  “What is the Security Council?,” United Nations Security Council, accessed November 4, 
2018, http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/.
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25 of the UN Charter.30 The UN Security Council has five permanent 
members: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and 
Russia. And the way the Charter is structured, a decision can only be taken 
if all five of the permanent members concur in that decision.31 And, of 
course, in the last several years Russia—acting as protector of the Syrian 
client state—has vetoed a number of resolutions, including a resolution 
to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court and a 
variety of other resolutions related to Syria that were favored by us and 
many other countries.32 
scharf: So, what is it about Syria that Russia likes so much? They do 
have a port in Tartus; is that important to them?33 
buchwald: Yes that’s important to them. What’s also important to them 
is their influence in the area, and I think it’s partly a way to demonstrate 
that they have to be met on their terms. There have been lots of proposals 
to get around—lots of ideas for getting around—the Russian veto.34 There 
are ideas to amend the Charter of the United Nations to take away or limit 
the use of the veto. The political reality is that I don’t think there’s a way 
around it. The Security Council veto is hard-baked into the Charter. I 
think in the reality of that, leaders—more and more—will come to other 
ways of organizing international efforts. In Syria it’s hard to do anything 
effective because the Syrians, basically, are winning the war, and that’s the 
reality that lawyers and policymakers in Washington are having a hard 
time dealing with.35
scharf: But the US has taken matters into its own hands: on April 6, 
2017, the US fired fifty-six cruise missiles at a Syrian airbase after Syria 
30.  Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs Supplement, Supplement No. 10 
(2000–2009), http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../repertory/art25/english/rep_supp10 
_vol3_art25.pdfandlang=E.
31.  “United Nations Security Council Fast Facts,” CNN, March 28, 2018, https://www 
.cnn.com/2013/09/03/world/united-nations-security-council-fast-facts/index.html.
32.  Syria: Does Russia Always Use a Veto at the UN Security Council?, BBC, April 16, 
2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-43781954.
33.  Frank Gardner, “How Vital is Syria’s Tartus Port to Russia?,” BBC, June 27, 2012, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18616191.
34.  Louis Charbonneau, “Dozens of Nations Back French Appeal to Limit Use of UN 
Veto,” Reuters, September 30, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-assembly-veto 
-idUSKCN0RU30V20150930.
35.  “Why Assad is Winning the War in Syria,” PBS, April 14, 2018, https://www.pbs.org 
/newshour/show/why-assad-is-winning-the-war-in-syria.
35
Broadcasts: Talking Foreign Policy
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2019
147Talking Foreign Policy Transcripts
deployed sarin gas in the town of Khan Shaykhun near Damascus.36 And 
then, on April 14, 2018, the UK, the US, and France together fired a 
hundred and five cruise missiles at Syrian chemical weapons production 
and storage facilities after the Syrian government deployed chlorine gas in 
the Damascus suburb of Duma.37 Milena, do most governments and legal 
experts believe that these air strikes were lawful under international law 
given the Security Council’s paralysis because of Russia’s veto?
sterio: I think that most governments and legal experts, as of now, do 
not believe that these airstrikes were lawful under international law because 
international law has a very basic norm, which is a prohibition on states to 
use force against other states. The only two well-accepted, well-recognized 
exceptions to that ban are situations where there is Security Council approval 
for the use of force and self-defense.38 And, as Todd just told us regarding 
Syria, there is no Security Council authorization, nor will there be one in 
the near future, because of the Russian and, perhaps, Chinese veto.39 So 
the Security Council is a no-go in this situation. And it’s very hard for the 
US, the UK, and France to argue that they acted in self-defense because 
Assad was using the chemical weapons only against Syrian citizens, in areas 
where there were no US, UK, or French forces nearby. One argument that 
some scholars, and I know you, Michael, are starting to talk and write about 
this, is this idea that humanitarian intervention is another exception to this 
ban on the use of force.40 And so, unless we’re willing to accept this idea 
of humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorization as 
an exception to the use of force, it is hard to legally justify the airstrikes. 
scharf: People have been talking about this for almost twenty years. 
Paul, for example, you participated in the negotiations at Rambouillet 
to try to avert the Kosovo conflict. And after the 1999 NATO airstrikes 
against Serbia to halt the ethnic cleansing of the Kosovo Albanians, the 
36.  Michael R. Gordon, Helene Cooper, and Michael D. Shear, “Dozens of US Missiles 
Hit Air Base in Syria,” New York Times, April 6, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com 
/2017/04/06/world/middleeast/us-said-to-weigh-military-responses-to-syrian-chemical 
-attack.html.
37.  “Syria Air Strikes: US and Allies Attack ‘Chemical Weapons Site,’” BBC, April 14, 2018, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43762251.
38.  UN Charter, art. 2, para. 4; UN Charter, art. 51. 
39.  “Syria War: Russia and China Veto Sanctions,” BBC, February 28, 2017, https://www. 
bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39116854.
40.  Sarah Almukhtar, “Most Chemical Attacks in Syria Get Little Attention. Here Are 34 
Confirmed Cases,” New York Times, April 13, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive 
/2018/04/13/world/middleeast/syria-chemical-attacks-maps-history.html.
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UN did endorse something called the “responsibility to protect,” or R2P 
doctrine.41 Does that doctrine permit unilateral humanitarian use of force 
like the airstrikes on Syria?
williams: Well Michael, my sense is that we’re very close to having 
international acceptance of a legal doctrine which permits the unilateral 
use of force. As Todd has pointed out, Security Council authorization is 
hard-baked into the UN Charter, but it’s being rampantly abused by the 
Russians to provide cover for states like Syria that are committing mass 
atrocities against their civilians—you know, four, maybe five hundred 
thousand killed by the regime.42 Milena properly pointed out that the 
doctrine was created to allow for states to intervene when a country was 
unable or unwilling to protect its population, or where it was actually, 
in fact, carrying out those atrocities. The early versions of R2P require 
Security Council authorization. But, I think we’ve seen in Kosovo there 
was a humanitarian intervention by NATO with no Security Council 
authorization.43 We’ve now had two interventions: first, by the Americans, 
and then by the Americans along with the French and the British in Syria, 
where there was no Security Council authorization.44 I think the flagrant 
violation of its responsibilities by Russia at the UN, coupled with this 
increasing trend of countries massacring their own civilians, is definitely 
tipping the scales in the direction of some type of souped-up responsibil-
ity to protect, which will no longer require authorization by the Security 
Council. And quite frankly, Mike, that day cannot come soon enough. 
scharf: So, about seventy countries around the world chimed in with sup-
port of the US/UK/French air strikes on Syria last April. The only countries 
that were against it, quite frankly, were Russia and Syria, and then China 
joined in.45 Does this overwhelming support—and other factors—indicate 
41.  “Responsibility to Protect, UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility 
to Protect,” accessed November 4, 2018, http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention 
/about-responsibility-to-protect.html.
42.  “Note to Correspondents, Transcripts of Press Stakeout by United Nations Special 
Envoy for Syria, Mr. Staffan de Mistura,” United Nations Secretary-General, April 22, 2016, 
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2016-04-22/note 
-correspondents-transcript-press-stakeout-united.
43.  Djamchid Momtaz, “NATO’S ‘Humanitarian Intervention’ in Kosovo and the Prohi-
bition of the Use of Force,” International Committee of the Red Cross 837, March 31, 2000, 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jqcr.htm. 
44.  “Syria: Does Russia Always Use a Veto at the UN Security Council?,” BBC, April 16, 
2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-43781954.
45.  Hannah Elis-Peterson, et al., “World Reacts to Overnight Strikes on Syria by US, UK, 
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that something is changing, as Milena pointed out? Let’s unpeel the onion 
and see how this new case might be different than other cases. So, first of 
all, let me ask the panelists at large: Does it matter that this case was about 
chemical weapons use and the targets were chemical weapons facilities, as 
opposed to—in the other cases—other types of crimes against humanity 
where the targets were broad military and governmental targets? In the Serbia 
case, they just bombed anything that was a military target, right?46 So, does 
that make a difference, Todd?
buchwald: I think, whether rightly or wrongly, with the way inter-
national law works it does make a difference. I think clearly something’s 
changing, and peoples’ willingness to accept this kind of thing is way higher, 
and goes up more and more, because of all the atrocious behavior we see in 
Syria. Whether a new legal rule emerges is not necessarily the same question. 
When you look at the way the president talked about what he had authorized, 
he didn’t really talk about it in terms of humanitarian intervention concepts. 
He talked about it in terms—like you’re talking about—of the special threat 
that weapons of mass destruction pose to US security.47 He’s dealing with it 
in a situation where US troops are already in the theater. And it seems to me 
that, in a not completely elegant way he’s groping for a self-defense kind of 
explanation for what he’s doing. But what’s interesting is that he’s justifying 
what he’s doing by an appeal to a humanitarian doctrine. But some scholars 
have opined that if the real rationale were humanitarian intervention, there 
were probably ways to save more lives than bombing those chemical facilities. 
If the idea is to get your most humanitarian bang for the buck, this wasn’t 
it. There’s a different explanation for why this happened. That’s at least one 
way to look at it. 
scharf: Milena?
sterio: The other thing that I would mention that’s really important 
regarding this particular intervention in April 2018 is the rhetoric used by 
the states—particularly the UK. The UK government specifically talked 
about humanitarian intervention and how this was legal under that doc-
and French Forces,” Guardian, April 14, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018 
/apr/14/airstrikes-syria-world-reacts-bombing-us-uk-french-forces.
46.  Brent Sadler and Christiane Amanpour, “NATO Attack on Yugoslavia Begins,” CNN, 
March 24, 1999, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9903/24/kosovo.strikes/.
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trine.48 When you go back to the Kosovo case, the State Department was 
very explicit that Kosovo was sui generis; it wasn’t supposed to create any 
kind of a precedent. They said “these were unique circumstances. We’re not 
arguing that humanitarian intervention is actually legal.” In the Kosovo case, 
others talked about how that intervention was legitimate but not legal, and 
there was moral authority for it even if there wasn’t legal authority.49 Now, 
the UK government is saying: “This is humanitarian intervention, this is 
legal.” And the US government is basically making statements like, “We’re 
in complete agreement with the UK.”50
scharf: Let me ask you, so Nikki Haley, the ambassador to the United 
Nations from the United States, said that at the Security Council there is 
a doctrine in international law that if a country adopts another country’s 
position or other group’s positions—if they ratify it—they can be held 
to be responsible for it. Isn’t this the kind of language that Nikki Haley 
used when she said, “We are in lockstep and in complete agreement with 
the UK”? Isn’t that close to a case of adoption under that doctrine?51 The 
adoption doctrine was once used in the International Court of Justice in 
the case of Iran’s adoption of the student protestors’ attack and takeover of 
the US embassy. The International Court of Justice said the government 
of Iran is now responsible because they applauded that action, and because 
they said that they agreed with it. How is this any different?52 Todd? 
buchwald: I think Nikki Haley’s words reflected a sort of purposeful 
ambiguity. “We’re in lockstep with them” is another way of just saying we 
were supportive of our allies. If you go back to the 1999 NATO intervention 
in Serbia, that is when the United Kingdom first said that humanitarian 
48.  “UK’s Theresa May Tells Lawmakers: Syria Strikes Were Legal and Moral,” NBC, April 
16, 2018, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/uk-s-theresa-may-tells-lawmakers 
-syria-strikes-were-legal-n866386.
49.  See David Lefkowitz, “On Moral Arguments against a Legal Right to Unilateral 
Humanitarian Intervention,” Public Affairs Quarterly 20 (April 2006): 115, http://www.jstor 
.org/stable/40441432.
50.  Steven A. Engel, “Memorandum Opinion for the Counsel to the President, April 2018 
Airstrikes against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities,” May 31, 2018, slip opinion, https://
www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/file/1067551/download. 
51.  Nicole Gaouette, “Richard Roth and Elizabeth Joseph, Haley Says US ‘Locked and 
Loaded,’ Prepared to Maintain Pressure on Syria,” CNN, April 14, 2018, https://www.cnn 
.com/2018/04/14/politics/un-meeting-syria-strikes/index.html.
52.  See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran), Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 1980 (May 24, 1980): 3, https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/64/064 
-19800524-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf.
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intervention was lawful.53 The UK used the doctrine again to justify the 
imposition of no-fly zones to protect Kurds and Shi’ites in Iraq. They had 
their theory, which was a humanitarian intervention theory. And the US 
had its own theory, which was not based on humanitarian intervention. To 
me, what I see going on is a long history of the United States coming up 
with a different rationale, other than humanitarian intervention, to justify 
its actions. For it to be real customary international law, state officials are 
going to have to stand up and say, clearly, “This is what we think.”
scharf: Paul, what do you think?
williams: Michael, I think the Brits have this right. The Brits realize 
that in today’s world, you’re going to need to engage in humanitarian 
intervention in cases like Kosovo and cases in Syria for your own national 
security and also just to protect, quite frankly, humanity. The Americans, 
for decades, have been dodging this question. The silliness of “It’s illegal, 
but it’s legitimate” and any possible rationale we could come up with. Quite 
frankly, it’s time for the US government—and I think the Trump admin-
istration to a degree, has—to embrace that doctrine. The US Department 
of Justice Office of Legal Counsel opinion on the Syria airstrikes talked 
about the relationship between the humanitarian catastrophe from use of 
chemical weapons against civilians and US security interests, so the United 
States is inching toward humanitarian intervention. But it’s time for the 
Americans to be serious; we are doing humanitarian intervention. Let’s 
create a legal framework, like the British have, for those interventions. Let’s 
do it in a limited circumstance, with limited scope, with as little force as 
possible, but let’s create a legal framework around it. Let’s not have it run 
free range around the globe because that’s when the Russians, the Chinese, 
and others will take advantage of a wobbly legal doctrine.
scharf: I will note that Harold Koh, who was the former legal advisor 
at the State Department, has chastised both the Democratic and Republican 
administrations of the United States for not being specific when they do 
humanitarian intervention and doing, instead, what Todd was describ-
ing54—having these factors, and saying it’s sui generis, which means there’s 
53.  Marc Weller, “Syria Air Strikes: Were they Legal?,” BBC, April 14, 2018, https://www 
.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43766556.
54.  See Harold Koh, “Humanitarian Intervention: Time for Better Law,” AJIL Unbound 11 
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no precedent, just “this is an exceptional case.” Koh said the risk of the US 
approach is that other countries will abuse the precedent because the US 
is creating a very amorphous precedent. It’s not that they’re creating no 
precedent, which is what—I think—the US hopes is happening. Instead, 
they are creating a precedent, but it’s one where they are letting the genie 
out of the bottle and people can interpret it in all different ways. I think 
that’s what you’re getting at. Is that right, Paul? 
williams: Yes, the Russians have used a version of this humanitarian 
intervention for their intervention in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Crimea, 
and eastern Ukraine. None of those are humanitarian interventions that 
would be justified by the UK rationale.55
scharf: But the answer is not to say, then, that there shouldn’t be any 
humanitarian interventions, but to cabin it off with some very precise rules.
williams: Right.
sterio: Well Michael, Russia is citing the Kosovo precedent,56 although 
the State Department is saying it’s not a precedent.57 
scharf: This is Harold Koh’s point. 
sterio: Exactly. And Harold Koh said that we, as lawyers, shouldn’t be—I 
think he called us “potted plants.”58 That it is our duty to get out there.
scharf: Get out there first and articulate clear doctrine. 
sterio: Exactly. 
williams: We’re creating precedent—let’s stop pretending we’re not 
creating precedent. 
scharf: So, one of the lawyers in the studio is an international prosecutor. 
Let me bring Jim Johnson back into the conversation. Jim, what is being 
done to pave the way for war crimes trials of President Assad and others in 
55.  Marc Weller, “Analysis: Why Russia’s Crimea Move Fails Legal Test,” BBC, March 7, 
2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26481423.
56.  Irina Filatova, “The Kosovo Precedent,” Guardian, February 23, 2008, https://www 
.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/feb/23/thekosovoprecedent.
57.  Id.
58.  Harold Koh, “Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention (Part III–A Reply),” 
EJIL:Talk!, October 12, 2013, https://www.ejiltalk.org/syria-and-the-law-of 
-humanitarian-intervention-part-iii-a-reply/. 
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Syria that are using chemical weapons, that are using barrel bombs, that 
are torturing people—and seem to be getting away with it?59
johnson: Well, Michael, as we mentioned a few minutes ago, one of 
the concerns right now is that for many of these leaders of rogue regimes, 
there is no option to prosecute them—as in the case of Syria.60 
scharf: What about the European countries that have launched prosecu-
tions of Syrians based on universal jurisdiction in their national courts?61 
Is that working?
johnson: There have been some cases brought against lower figures, 
but they have not pursued a case against President Assad as he is protected 
by head of state immunity. And when you look from an international per-
spective, there does not seem to be an option to prosecute him.62 Attempts 
to either create an ad hoc tribunal or to refer this case to the International 
Criminal Court have been vetoed by Russia and others in the Security 
Council. But that doesn’t mean that steps are not being taken. The most 
critical element of cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity is to 
get in and to collect and preserve the evidence. 
scharf: And that’s being done? 
johnson: That is being done, and initiatives are taking place to help 
that process along. First, really, since the start of the war in Syria, several 
NGOs have been attempting to collect and gather evidence in Syria and, 
most importantly, to preserve that evidence. And, now, the United Nations 
has taken steps. The General Assembly has established the International 
Independent and Impartial Mechanism, which has been created to collect, 
collate, and preserve evidence of war crimes in Syria—so that eventually if 
there is a prosecution that can indeed take place, it will.63 You look at the 
59.  Terry Atlas, “Hawkish Advisors Get Key Trump Roles,” Arms Control Association, May 1, 
2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-05/news/hawkish-advisers-get-key-trump 
-roles. 
60.  Eliza Mackintosh, “War Crimes Prosecutor Quits Syria Inquiry Over UN Inaction,” 
CNN, August 7, 2015, 7:57 a.m., https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/07/middleeast/syria 
-war-crimes-investigator-del-ponte-resigns/index.html.
61.  Maria Elena Vignoli, “These Are the Crimes We Are Fleeing: Justice For Syria in 




63.  G.A. Res. 71/248, December 21, 2016.
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killing fields of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, for example: it was thirty 
years after they fell from power that Cambodia finally created a tribunal 
that could try the genocide in Cambodia.64
scharf: Meanwhile, if countries are getting impatient about prosecutions, 
I do note that Pulitzer prize winning journalist Bob Woodward’s new book 
said that the White House had considered, seriously, the assassination of 
President Assad.65 Let me turn to Paul: What’s your take on that? What are 
the pros and cons of using assassination as a policy tool against rogue leaders? 
williams: Wow, that’d be the ultimate humanitarian intervention. It’s 
highly dangerous, it’s highly unpredictable, and it’s highly destabilizing. 
I think this would be a return to the bad old days of targeting individual 
leaders, which is something—although we’re quite extensively engaged in 
targeting terrorist leaders—we’ve very much moved away from the days 
of targeting heads of state. To do so without a plan for state building, or 
without a plan for an alternative government, could be very dangerous and 
very destabilizing, and wouldn’t accomplish the objective of stopping the 
atrocities on the ground. 
scharf: And I suppose it could turn the globe into a version of the Old 
West, where countries are just trying to assassinate each other’s leaders left 
and right?
williams: Yes. 
scharf: Right, now there is a taboo against that.
williams: There is a taboo, and that taboo supports our strategic interests. 
scharf: Alright, well, it’s time for another short break. When we return, 
we’ll talk about some of the other rogue regime flashpoints around the world. 
Back in a moment.
 This is Michael Scharf and we’re back with Talking Foreign Policy. I’m 
joined today by some of the world’s foremost experts on dealing with rogue 
nations. In this final segment of our broadcast, I want to ask our experts to 
discuss some of the other states that the Trump administration has labeled 
64.  See Wolfgang Form, “Justice 30 Years Later? The Cambodian Special Tribunal for the 
Punishment of Crimes against Humanity by the Khmer Rouge,” Journal of Nationalism and 
Ethnicity 37, no. 6 (November 2009): 889. 
65.  Ben Jacobs, “Trump ‘Wanted Assad Assassinated’: Key Claims in Bob Woodward’s 
Book,” Guardian, September 4, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018 
/sep/04/donald-trump-bob-woodward-fear-syria-assad-claims. 
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as rogue regimes, starting with Iran.66 Paul Williams: Tell us why Iran 
should be on our radar as a rogue state.
williams: Well, Mike, if we were to employ Todd’s rogueness scale, 
we’d find that the Iranians are at the top of the scale. When the Iranians 
aren’t busy attempting to build nuclear weapons or ballistic missile delivery 
systems for those nuclear weapons, they’re overseeing tens of thousands of 
elite Iranian troops operating in Syria, fighting against the Syrian opposition, 
and committing atrocities against the Syrian people. They’re also funding 
and directing Hezbollah and their operations inside Syria.67 They’re heav-
ily engaged in Yemen, providing assistance and weapons to the Houthis.68 
They’re providing ballistic missiles to the Houthis in Yemen that can reach 
Riyadh—and have reached Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia.69 They still 
maintain a vast terrorist network throughout the Middle East and North 
Africa.70 They basically are a highly destabilizing actor in the region. 
scharf: Alright, well, the Iranians do sound, from that description, like 
the bad boys of the Middle East. We, until recently, had an Iranian nuclear 
accord, which the United Nations and the inspectors said was actually 
working.71 Milena, why did the United States pull out of that?
sterio: The Iranian nuclear accord, which was signed back in 2015, 
provided essentially that Iran was temporally halted in its production of 
66.  “At UN, Trump Singles out ‘Rogue’ Nations North Korea and Iran,” New York Times, 
September 19, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/19/world/americas/united- 
nations-general-assembly.html.
67.  Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances: Funding the Party of God,” Washington Institute 
for Near East Policy, February 2005, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis 
/view/hezbollah-finances-funding-the-party-of-god.
68.  Farzin Nadimi and Michael Knights, “Iran’s Support to Houthi Air Defenses in 
Yemen,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 4, 2018, https://www 
.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-support-to-houthi-air-defenses 
-in-yemen.
69.  Stephen Kalin, “Saudi Arabia Intercepts Missile over Riyadh: Al Arabiya,” Reuters, April 
11, 2018, 10:47 a.m., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-security/saudi-arabia 
-intercepts-missile-over-riyadh-al-arabiya-iduskbn1hi28k.
70.  Carol Morello, “Terrorism is Down Worldwide, But State Department Says Iran Main-
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enriched uranium for military purposes. The accord was going to be valid 
for fifteen years. In exchange for that, there was an easing and lifting of UN 
sanctions against Iran.72 So, Iran had, definitely, a financial incentive to stay 
in the agreement. President Trump, back when he was candidate Trump, 
pretty often talked about the Iran agreement as a bad deal that he wanted to 
pull out of. And now he has announced that the US is indeed pulling out.73 
There doesn’t seem to be a Plan B, so it’s unclear what happens now in terms 
of US policies vis-à-vis Iran. In terms of explaining why he pulled out of the 
agreement, some commenters think it was all about undermining President 
Obama’s legacy. If you view the Iran agreement as one of the high points 
of the Obama presidency, it has to do with undermining that.74 Also, it has 
to do with turning more strategically toward our allies such as Israel, and 
perhaps Saudi Arabia,75 and the influence of some more hawkish advisors in 
the Trump administration, such as, for example: Mike Pompeo, who is now 
secretary of state, and John Bolton, who is now the national security advisor.76 
scharf: You said there didn’t seem to be a Plan B, but prior to being 
appointed to the position of national security advisor, John Bolton did 
publicly advocate Israeli airstrikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities.77 Ambas-
sador Todd Buchwald: What would be the pros and cons of either US or 
Israeli airstrikes against those nuclear facilities? 
buchwald: Well, there are actual examples of the Israelis attacking 
nuclear reactors in Iraq in 1981, a reactor called Osirak.78 At that time, 
the United States actually condemned the Israelis, with President Reagan 
72.  William J. Broad and Sergio Pecanha, “The Iran Nuclear Deal—A Simple Guide,” New 
York Times, January 15, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/31/world 
/middleeast/simple-guide-nuclear-talks-iran-us.html.
73.  Catherine Lucey and Josh Lederman, “Trump Declares US Leaving ‘Horrible’ Iran 
Nuclear Accord,” Chicago Tribune, May 8, 2018, https://www.chicagotribune.com/news 
/nationworld/politics/ct-iran-nuclear-deal-20180508-story.html.
74.  Anthony Zurcher, “Three Reasons Behind Trump Ditching Iran Deal,” BBC, May 8, 
2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-4390237.
75.  “Iran Nuclear Deal: Winners and Losers from Trump’s Decision to Quit,” BBC, May 9, 
2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-44055174.
76.  Terry Atlas, “Hawkish Advisors Get Key Trump Roles, Arms Control Association,” May 
1, 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-05/news/hawkish-advisers-get-key 
-trump-roles.
77.  Vaughn P. Shannon, “US Reaction to the 2009 Iranian Election: The End of ‘Regime 
Change’ Politics,” Journal of Iranian Research and Analysis 26, vol. 2 (2009): 47, 55.
78.  David K Shipler, “Israeli Jets Destroy Iraqi Atomic Reactor; Attack Condemned by US 
and Arab Nations,” New York Times, June 9, 1981, https://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/09 
/world/israeli-jets-destroy-iraqi-atomic-reactor-attack-condemned-us-arab-nations.html.
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mitigating a little bit by saying the Israelis believed what they were doing 
was right. However, there was a clear condemnation.79 There was another 
attack by the Israelis in 2007—same idea, though it wasn’t acknowledged 
until much later.80 It’s a hard situation. I think that legal concepts will only 
dictate to a certain degree—and not that great of a degree—what country’s 
decisions will be in using force in situations where they feel themselves 
under existential threat. But, as a practical matter, if you’re thinking about 
something like this, you’d have to think through the situation. Can the 
reactors be destroyed? What are the benefits? What are the costs? How 
are you going to mitigate the costs? And—very importantly—how is the 
world going to react even if you can pull it off? And where you will end 
up on the rogueness scale? I think it’s a lot easier to say—when you’re out 
of government—that this is a good idea, than to be in government and do 
it. I suspect that this is not really in the cards for the foreseeable future. 
scharf: I hope you’re right about that. Paul Williams: Let’s go to a slightly 
different part of the globe. You’ve been involved in peace negotiations in 
both Yemen and the Sudan. Can you bring us up to date on what the situ-
ation is in those countries and what policy options you would recommend 
for the United States with regard to them? 
williams: As Todd pointed out, now that we’re all out of government, we 
have lots of leeway to recommend policy options. So, I’ve got a few there. Both 
Yemen and Sudan have become never-ending wars. In Yemen, in particular, 
you’ve got a three- or four-way conflict by the parties in Yemen. But it’s 
been a spill-in conflict with the Iranians and the Saudis heavily engaged in 
supporting the parties, and the Americans, the British, and the French provid-
ing a lot of weapons to our allies: the Saudis, the UAE, and others that are 
engaged.81 There are two problems with Yemen. One, there’s no momentum 
for a peace process. Two, our allies—the Saudis—have incredibly bad aim, 
79.  Steven R. Weisman, “Regan Asserts Israel Had Cause to Mistrust Iraq,” New York Times, 
June 17, 1981, https://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/17/world/reagan-asserts-israel-had 
-cause-to-mistrust-iraq.html.
80.  Stephen Farrell, “Israel Admits Bombing Suspected Syrian Nuclear Reactor in 2007, 
Warns Iran,” Reuters, March 20, 2018, 11:13 p.m., https://www.reuters.com/article 
/us-israel-syria-nuclear/israel-admits-bombing-suspected-syrian-nuclear-reactor 
-in-2007-warns-iran-iduskbn1gx09k.
81.  The Editorial Board, “Why are US Bombs Killing Civilians in Yemen?, New York Times, 
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and thousands of civilians have been killed by American-made weapons.82 
It’s time to bring an end to the conflict in Yemen. The Americans have a 
lot of leverage that they can put on the Saudis and the others to be serious 
about engaging the peace process. And, with the continued sanctions on Iran, 
there’s also international leverage to get the Iranians to be serious. But, it’s 
going to have to be the Americans, and their allies, that pressure our allies 
to come to the table and negotiate peace. In Sudan, we’ve got nearly thirty 
years of conflict—this is the Darfur genocide, and it continues.83 There’s also 
expanded conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile.84 This is a case where 
we actually have a tribunal that’s engaged. The International Criminal Court 
has indicted the president of Sudan for crimes against humanity, and yet he 
wanders the globe unencumbered.85 We need to be serious about putting 
pressure on countries like South Africa—and other countries which host 
president al-Bashir in the face of the International Criminal Court’s arrest 
warrant—and threaten sanctions if they do not send Omar al-Bashir to the 
ICC to stand trial for crimes against humanity and genocide. Until we are 
serious about ending these conflicts and use the leverage that we have, we 
are going to see these wars continue without end—with continued genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and civilian casualties. 
scharf: Let me bring Jim in on that question. So, Jim Johnson: You 
have prosecuted a head of state, Charles Taylor, of Liberia, at the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone. As Paul mentioned, al-Bashir, the president of the 
Sudan, has been indicted for genocide, and he just pops over to neighboring 
countries. He’s even gone as far as China.86 They allow him to come in 
as an honored guest. The International Criminal Court screams and yells, 
“He’s under indictment, you have to arrest him, you have to send him to 
us,” and nothing happens. The International Criminal Court takes the case 
to the Security Council and says, “You’re the Security Council, you sent 
82.  Id. 
83.  Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah, “Sudan Events of 2017,” Human Rights Watch, September 
23, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/sudan.
84.  Id. 
85.  “Where Can Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir Go Now?,” BBC, June 15, 2015, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33140917.
86.  “Beijing Defends Sudan President Bashir’s Presence at China-Africa Summit,” Agencia 
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this case to us, do something!” And they don’t do anything.87 What does 
this tell us about the state of international criminal justice? 
johnson: Well, Michael, it doesn’t necessarily tell us anything good. 
States have always and will continue to act in what they see is their best 
interest. One of the largest impediments that the modern international tri-
bunals have had from the start—when you look at the Yugoslavia Tribunal, 
the Rwandan Tribunal, our tribunal, and now the ICC—is getting states 
to live up to their obligations to these tribunals. It took us three years to 
bring Charles Taylor into our custody after we indicted him.88 
scharf: Well, fortunately international criminal law is patient and per-
sistent. We’re out of time. Todd Buchwald, Jim Johnson, Paul Williams, 
and Milena Sterio—thank you for your insights! This is Michael Scharf 
and you’ve been listening to Talking Foreign Policy. 
Talking Foreign Policy is a production of Case Western Reserve University and is 
produced in partnership with WCPN 90.3fm Ideastream. Questions and comments 
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